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Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Health Care 
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski* 
Abstract: 
Artificial intelligence (AI) holds great promise for improved health-care 
outcomes. It has been used to analyze tumor images, to help doctors choose among 
different treatment options, and to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. But AI also 
poses substantial new hazards. This Article focuses on a particular type of health-
care harm that has thus far evaded significant legal scrutiny. The harm is 
algorithmic discrimination. 
Algorithmic discrimination in health care occurs with surprising frequency. A 
well-known example is an algorithm used to identify candidates for “high risk care 
management” programs that routinely failed to refer racial minorities for these 
beneficial services. Furthermore, some algorithms deliberately adjust for race in 
ways that hurt minority patients. For example, according to a 2020 New England 
Journal of Medicine article, algorithms have regularly underestimated African 
Americans’ risks of kidney stones, death from heart failure, and other medical 
problems. 
This Article argues that algorithmic discrimination in medicine can violate 
civil rights laws such as Title VI and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act 
when it exacerbates health disparities or perpetuates inequities. It urges that 
algorithmic fairness constitute a key element in designing, implementing, and 
validating AI and that both legal and technical tools be deployed to promote 
fairness. To that end, we call for the reintroduction of the disparate impact theory 
as a robust litigation tool in the health-care arena and for the passage of an 
algorithmic accountability act. We also detail technical measures that AI 
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INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is no longer a novelty in the medical field, and its 
use is increasingly prevalent.1 According to a 2020 Washington Post article, “From 
diagnosing patients to policing drug theft in hospitals, AI has crept into nearly 
every facet of the health-care system, eclipsing the use of machine intelligence in 
other industries.”2 A KPMG survey of hundreds of business decision makers found 
that eighty-nine percent of respondents from the health-care industry believed that 
AI has already generated efficiencies in medical care, and ninety-one percent 
believe it has enhanced patients’ access to care.3 
AI, which does its work through learning algorithms and models,4 thus holds 
great promise for improved health-care outcomes, but it also poses substantial new 
risks and hazards.5 This article focuses on a particular type of health-care harm that 
has thus far evaded significant legal scrutiny. The harm is algorithmic 
discrimination. 
In a June 2019 statement, the American Medical Informatics Association 
urged the Food and Drug Administration to address AI biases related to ethnicity, 
gender, age, socioeconomic status, and disability.6 It suggested that the agency 
 
 1. MELANIE MITCHELL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR THINKING HUMANS 119 
(2019) (noting that AI will soon become widespread in medicine, “assisting physicians in diagnosing 
diseases and in suggesting treatments; discovering new drugs; and monitoring the health and safety 
of the elderly in their homes”); Amisha, Paras Malik, Monika Pathania & Vyas Kumar Rathaur, 
Overview of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 8 J. FAM. MED. & PRIMARY CARE 2328, 2328 (2019); 
W. Nicholson Price II, Risks and Remedies for Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, BROOKINGS 
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/risks-and-remedies-for-artificial-intelligence-
in-health-care. 
 2. Meryl Kornfield, The Health 202: Artificial Intelligence Use Is Growing in the U.S. 
Health-Care System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2020, 7:41 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2020/02/24/the-health-202-artificial-intelligence-use-is-
growing-in-the-u-s-health-care-system/5e52f13188e0fa632ba81ec7. 
 3. Living in an AI World: Achievements and Challenges in Artificial Intelligence Across Five 
Industries, KPMG 5 (2020), https://advisory.kpmg.us/content/dam/advisory/en/pdfs/2020/ 
living-in-ai-world.pdf. This study surveyed 751 business decision-makers from five industries who 
had “at least a moderate knowledge of AI. Id. at 2. 
 4. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Researchers sometimes use the terms 
“learning algorithm” and “model” interchangeably. More accurately, however, the term “model” 
suggests a representation of knowledge that is created by an algorithm. MAX KUHN & KJELL 
JOHNSON, APPLIED PREDICTIVE MODELING 2 (2013); SHAI SHALEV-SHWARTZ & SHAI BEN-DAVID, 
UNDERSTANDING MACHINE LEARNING: FROM THEORY TO ALGORITHMS 13-14 (2014). 
 5. Michael J. Rigby, Ethical Dimensions of Using Artificial Intelligence in Health Care, 21 
AMA J. ETHICS E121, E121-23 (2019); The Dangers of AI in the Healthcare Industry, THOMAS (May 
7, 2019), https://www.thomasnet.com/insights/the-challenges-and-dangers-of-ai-in-the-health-care-
industry-report. 
 6. AMIA Supports, Encourages Further Refinement of FDA AI/Machine Learning Regulatory 
Framework, AMIA (June 5, 2019), https://www.amia.org/news-and-publications/press-
release/amia-supports-encourages-further-refinement-fda-aimachine-learning. 
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issue guidance about testing and adjustment of algorithms.7 
There are many examples of algorithmic discrimination that have become 
infamous outside of the medical field. An algorithm designed to predict criminal 
recidivism exhibited bias against Black defendants.8 It incorrectly labeled Black 
defendants as likely to reoffend almost twice as often as in the case of White 
defendants, and it mislabeled White defendants as low-risk more frequently than 
Black defendants.9 In the employment arena, Amazon developed artificial 
intelligence-driven software to identify its best job candidates.10 It turned out, 
however, that the algorithm was biased against women and routinely concluded 
that men were preferable candidates.11 As a third example, in March of 2019, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development sued Facebook, asserting that it 
kept certain users from seeing housing ads based on machine-learning algorithms’ 
inferences about their race.12 
Algorithmic discrimination in employment, criminal law, housing, and other 
fields has garnered attention in the legal literature.13 Surprisingly, however, the 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing. 
 9. Id.; see also Melissa Hamilton, Debating Algorithmic Fairness, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 261, 
264 (2019) (reporting that the risk tool’s corporate owner denied the allegation and stated that its 
reanalysis of the data led it to conclude that “the tool was unbiased as blacks and whites had similar 
positive predictive values for recidivism”); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 
2218, 2221-22 (2019) (discussing algorithmic risk assessment in the criminal justice system and its 
racial impact). 
 10. MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM 60-61 (2020) (relating that 
Amazon’s algorithm “was found to be explicitly penalizing resumes that contained the word 
women’s, as in “women’s chess club captain,” and downgraded candidates who listed the names of 
two particular all-women colleges”); Katherine Maher, Opinion, Without Humans, A.I. Can Wreak 
Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/ 
opinion/artificial-intelligence-wikipedia.html. 
 11. Id.; see infra Sections II.B-C for a discussion of bias. 
 12. Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist 
Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/ 
tech-racism-algorithms.html. 
 13. Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1671, 1692-96 (2020) (discussing automated decision-making in employment); Solon Barocas 
& Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 675 (2016) (focusing on 
Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic 
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE. L.J. 1043, 1053-54 (2019) (discussing the discriminatory effects of 
implementing AI in the criminal justice setting); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age 
of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (discussing various applications of artificial 
intelligence that lead to discrimination, including in the criminal justice, housing, and employment 
realms); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 
(2017) (discussing employers’ use of data analytics to make workplace decisions); Gerhard Wagner 
& Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping 
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legal literature has not focused on AI-related discrimination in health care, even 
though it clearly occurs.14 A well-known example is an algorithm used to identify 
candidates for “high risk care management” programs that routinely failed to refer 
racial minorities for these beneficial services.15 Other algorithms explicitly adjust 
for race, adding or subtracting risk points based on patients’ ancestral 
background.16 This Article, therefore, fills a noticeable gap in the treatment of AI 
in legal scholarship. 
Learning algorithms17 are trained on data, which means that the quality of the 
data is vital to the reliability of the AI algorithm.18 Data sources such as electronic 
health records (EHR) or insurance claims can be rife with errors, systemic biases, 
and data gaps that might be particularly pronounced for minorities who do not 
receive optimal care.19 In addition, datasets may be too small or not diverse enough 
because disadvantaged populations face health-care access barriers.20 Moreover, if 
datasets capture historical health disparities, AI could learn to perpetuate patterns 
of discrimination.21 These defects and others can make algorithms work poorly 
when they are deployed in the real world.22 
This Article argues that algorithmic discrimination may violate Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act.23 It further argues 
that algorithmic fairness must be a key element in designing, implementing, and 
validating AI. To that end, AI experts and policy makers must employ both 
technical and legal tools to promote algorithmic fairness. Among other 
recommendations, the Article calls for the reintroduction of the disparate impact 
 
Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 583 
(2019) (discussing the ways in which big data and artificial intelligence exploit human bias in 
online marketing and purchases). 
 14. See infra Section II.E (providing examples of algorithmic bias that generate discriminatory 
outcomes). 
 15. See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
 17. Strictly speaking, the algorithms at issue are called “supervised learning algorithms.” 
Danilo Bzdok, Martin Krzywinski & Naomi Altman, Machine Learning: Supervised Methods, 15 
NATURE METHODS 5, 5 (2018). For purposes of brevity, we will use the term “learning algorithm.” 
 18. See Ignacio Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1389, 1410 (2019) (“[A]n algorithmic decision-making process can only be as good as the data 
that it uses.”); Ravi B. Parikh, Stephanie Teeple & Amol S. Navathe, Addressing Bias in Artificial 
Intelligence in Health Care, 322 JAMA 2377, 2377 (2019); A.I. Bias in Healthcare: Human Pride, 
Machine Prejudice, MED. FUTURIST (Sept. 19, 2019), https:// 
medicalfuturist.com/a-i-bias-in-healthcare. See infra Part I, for a discussion of how AI works. 
 19. Parikh et al., supra note 18, at 2377. 
 20. A.I. Bias in Healthcare: Human Pride, Machine Prejudice, supra note 18. 
 21. Alvin Rajkomar, Michaela Hardt, Michael D. Howell, Greg Corrado & Marshall H. Chin, 
Ensuring Fairness in Machine Learning to Advance Health Equity, 18 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 866, 
866 (2018). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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theory as a robust litigation tool in the health-care arena.24 
Fairness is a complicated concept with no comprehensive or universally 
accepted definition in the AI context,25 or for that matter, even in philosophy.26 For 
the purposes of this Article, a useful conception includes three elements: equal 
outcomes, equal performance, and equal allocation.27 More specifically, fairness 
requires that minority and majority groups benefit equally from AI in terms of 
patient outcomes, that AI is equally accurate for minority and non-minority 
patients, and that AI allocate resources proportionately to all groups.28 We use the 
term “minority” broadly to include all individuals whom the civil rights laws aim 
to protect, including women, older people, and individuals with disabilities.29 It is 
further important to understand that there are frequently competing notions of 
fairness that cannot all be fulfilled simultaneously.30 For example, group fairness 
may be inconsistent with individual fairness.31 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the use of 
AI in medicine and describes its benefits. Part II analyzes the discrimination-
related pitfalls of AI. It explains measurement error, selection bias, and feedback 
loop bias and provides numerous examples of algorithmic discrimination in health 
care. It also discusses other discrimination risks associated with AI, including 
inequitable deployment of AI and the development of racially tailored medicine 
by which AI potentially recommends different treatments for members of different 
populations. Part III focuses on theories of discrimination that may apply to health-
care inequities. These include intentional discrimination and disparate impact 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1557 of the Affordable 
Care Act. Under existing law, however, plaintiffs face many hurdles and may well 
 
 24. See infra Section III.A. 
 25. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 69-72; Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic 
Fairness, 106 VA. L. REV. 811, 820-28 (2020); Alexandra Chouldechova & Aaron Roth, A Snapshot 
of the Frontiers of Fairness in Machine Learning, 63 COMM. ACM 82 (2020). 
 26. Reuben Binns, Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from Political Philosophy, 81 
PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 1 (2018) (“Various definitions proposed in recent literature make 
different assumptions about what terms like discrimination and fairness mean and how they can be 
defined in mathematical terms.”). 
 27. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 868-69. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text (describing protected classes under the 
civil rights statutes and listing relevant laws). 
 30. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 84-86 (discussing “fairness fighting fairness” 
(capitalization in title omitted)); Hellman, supra note 25, at 827 (discussing circumstances in which 
it is “impossible to have parity between . . . groups along all the possible dimensions of fairness”). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 378-387; see also Doaa Abu-Elyounes, Contextual 
Fairness: A Legal and Policy Analysis of Algorithmic Fairness, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 
38 (“[F]rom both a policy and technical perspective, satisfying several notions of fairness 
simultaneously is mutually incompatible.”); Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 
108 GEO. L.J. 803, 817-20 (2020) (discussing group fairness and individual fairness). 
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eschew litigation. Consequently, many discriminatory algorithms could be left 
unchallenged. 
The last part of the paper transitions to formulating a series of 
recommendations. Part IV addresses legal intervention. First, it suggests adding an 
explicit private cause of action for disparate impact to Title VI and Section 1557. 
Second, it discusses and critiques the proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act. 
Third, it briefly addresses regulation by the Food and Drug Administration. Part V 
develops recommendations for improving algorithm design, validation, and 
monitoring processes. These include steps that both algorithm designers and 
algorithm users can implement. This section also cautions that AI experts, health-
care providers, and patients must have realistic expectations about the degree of 
fairness they can achieve and may often need to prioritize among competing 
fairness goals. Part VI concludes. 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN MEDICINE 
A. How AI Works 
The term “artificial intelligence,” (AI) refers to computers’ ability to mimic 
human behavior and learn.32 Learning is carried out with the aid of algorithms. An 
algorithm is a “computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as 
input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”33 It is thus “a sequence 
of computational steps that transform the input into the output.”34 Users often rely 
on AI to help them make decisions or to make decisions for them.35 They may 
input information about a patient’s symptoms, medical history, and demographics 
and obtain a likely diagnosis or recommended treatment as the AI output.36 
A large subfield of AI is machine learning (ML), which enables computers to 
“automatically detect patterns in data, and then use the uncovered patterns to 
predict future data or to perform decision-making tasks under uncertainty.”37 
 
 32. IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 1-2 (2016). 
 33. THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Section I.B. (discussing the benefits of AI). 
 36. Xiaoxuan Liu, A Comparison of Deep Learning Performance against Health-Care 
Professionals in Detecting Diseases from Medical Imaging: a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 
1 LANCET DIGITAL HEALTH E271, E271 (2019); AI System Works with Physicians to Identify the Most 
Helpful Treatments for People Diagnosed with Depression, MAYO CLINIC MAG., Fall 2019, 
https://mayomagazine.mayoclinic.org/2019/11/ai-system-works-with-physicians-to-identify-the-
most-helpful-treatments-for-people-diagnosed-with-depression (“AI methodologies can discover 
patterns in a patient’s data . . . that can explain unique characteristics of the specific patient, allowing 
for the right treatment to be chosen at the right time and right dose to achieve the therapeutic 
benefit.”). 
 37. KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1 (2012); see also 
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn about Machine 
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Scientists train machine-learning algorithms to do analytical work by feeding them 
information, known as training data.38 For example, scientists might show a 
learning algorithm a large number of tumor x-rays or scans, indicating which ones 
are and are not cancerous.39 These designations of input data are known as labels.40 
The algorithm then learns to distinguish between benign and malignant masses 
based on patterns in the tumor images, so that it can identify cancerous tumors 
when shown new images.41 Once data scientists determine that the algorithm’s 
performance is satisfactory, it can be deployed to classify images with unknown 
labels.42 
Some machine-learning algorithms are trained only once, and others 
continuously learn and adapt over time.43 If an algorithm is adaptive and 
perpetually learns based on its real-world experience, the outputs it generates for 
particular inputs may change over time .44 
Algorithms often examine large collections of information, known as “big 
data,” from sources such as EHR databases or the Internet in order to unearth 
hidden knowledge or patterns.45 “Big data” can be defined as data that is of high 
volume, variety, and velocity, the last referring to the speed with which it is 
generated.46 In medicine, big data can come from a myriad of sources, including 
patients, health-care providers, insurers, manufacturers, the government, and even 
mobile devices such as smartphones and wearables.47 
 
Learning, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017) (“Fundamentally, machine learning refers to an 
automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes alternatively referred to as relationships 
or patterns) between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions or estimates of some 
outcome.”); Alvin Rajkomar, Jeffrey Dean & Isaac Kohane, Machine Learning in Medicine, 380 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1348 (2019) (“[I]n machine learning, a model learns from examples rather 
than being programmed with rules.”). 
 38. See SHALEV-SHWARTZ & BEN-DAVID, supra note 4, at 13-14 (discussing “the statistical 
learning framework”); see, e.g., Niha Beig et al., Perinodular and Intranodular Radiomic Features 
on Lung CT Images Distinguish Adenocarcinomas from Granulomas, 290 RADIOLOGY 783, 784 
(2019) (“A machine classifier was trained on a cohort of 145 patients . . . .”). 
 39. Beig et al., supra note 38, at 784. 
 40. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 867. 
 41. Beig et al., supra note 38, at 792. 
 42. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 867. 
 43. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MODIFICATIONS TO 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE 
(SAMD) 3 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/files/medical%20devices/published/US-FDA-Artificial-
Intelligence-and-Machine-Learning-Discussion-Paper.pdf; AMIA Supports, Encourages Further 
Refinement of FDA AI/Machine Learning Regulatory Framework, supra note 6. 
 44. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 43, at 3. 
 45. JIAWEI HAN, MICHELINE KAMBER & JIAN PEI, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 
8 (3d ed. 2012). 
 46. SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND 
POLICY 111 (2016). 
 47. Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
9
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Algorithms have different degrees of transparency and explainability.48 In 
some cases, they are opaque because they rely on extremely complex rules, and 
even their programmers are unsure of exactly how they work in particular 
instances.49 Some experts describe clinician reliance on nontransparent, 
noninterpretable algorithms as “black-box medicine.”50 
B. The Benefits of AI in Medicine 
AI can generate many benefits by allowing experts to analyze very large data 
sets quickly and efficiently, potentially delivering improved health care at a lower 
cost.51 If computers rather than humans do some of the work, health-care providers 
can lower staffing costs and accomplish tasks more quickly.52 
AI is valuable for physicians, researchers, and policy makers.53 Learning 
algorithms can help doctors predict which patients are likely to have either poor or 
successful treatment outcomes and to adjust medical decisions accordingly.54 AI 
may also help identify high-risk individuals whom doctors should screen regularly 
for specific illnesses.55 Likewise, AI can analyze EHRs in order to determine which 
patients are good candidates for clinical trials so that researchers can recruit them.56 
AI can further expedite medical discoveries as learning algorithms examine big 
data and discern previously unknown patterns, connections, and causal effects.57 
 
SOC’Y 61, 63-65 (2017) (discussing the breadth of big data sources). 
 48. Milena A. Gianfrancesco, Suzanne Tamang, Jinoos Yazdany & Gabriela Schmajuk, 
Potential Biases in Machine Learning Algorithms Using Electronic Health Record Data, 178 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1544, 1546 (2018) (“Certain machine learning models . . . are less transparent than 
others . . . and therefore may be harder to interpret.”); W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence 
in the Medical System: Four Roles for Potential Transformation, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 122, 124 (2019) (referring to “explainable algorithms versus black-box methods”). 
 49. Tokio Matsuzaki, Ethical Issues of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 
255, 269 (2018) (“One concern is that AI decision-making . . . often has no transparency. This means 
that doctors and patients are not able to know how the Al system reached the decision.”); W. 
Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 430 (2017). 
 50. Price, supra note 49, at 429; see Eric J. Topol, High-Performance Medicine: The 
Convergence of Human and Artificial Intelligence, 25 NATURE MED. 44, 51 (2019); Effy Vayena, 
Alessandro Blasimme & I. Glenn Cohen, Machine Learning in Medicine: Addressing Ethical 
Challenges, PLOS MED., Nov. 2018, art. no. e1002689, at 3. 
 51. Alicia Phaneuf, Use of AI in Healthcare & Medicine Is Booming – Here’s How the Market 
Is Benefiting from AI in 2020 and Beyond, BUS. INSIDER (July 31, 2019, 10:48 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/artificial-intelligence-healthcare. 
 52. Id. (noting that “30% of healthcare costs are associated with administrative tasks”). 
 53. EWOUT W. STEYERBERG, CLINICAL PREDICTION MODELS 1-3, 11 (2009). 
 54. Id. at 11. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Stefan Harrer, Pratik Shah, Bhavna Antony & Jianying Hu, Artificial Intelligence for 
Clinical Trial Design, 40 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 577, 580 (2019). 
 57. W. Nicholson Price II, Black Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421 (2015). 
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Public health authorities and health-care providers are now using AI to address 
the COVID-19 pandemic.58 Researchers hope that AI will facilitate tracking the 
disease and predicting how and where it will spread.59 They are also undertaking 
initiatives to develop and understand the potential of AI tools for the diagnosis of 
patients and prediction of their disease course.60 To that end, experts are training 
AI models to diagnose COVID-19 using chest images and are developing AI tools 
to predict which COVID-19 patients will become severely ill.61 Likewise, a large 
Israeli health maintenance organization is using AI to help identify which of its 
participants is most at risk of severe COVID-19 symptoms.62 
Many hope that AI will also accelerate the development of a vaccine and the 
discovery of effective treatments.63 To illustrate, machine learning led researchers 
to conclude that the drugs atazanavir and baricitinib could possibly be repurposed 
to treat COVID-19.64 
Finally, AI has been harnessed to enforce public health orders. According to 
one report, “At airports and train stations across China, infrared cameras are used 
to scan crowds for people with high temperatures. They are sometimes used with 
a facial recognition system, which can pinpoint the individual with a high 
temperature and whether he or she is wearing a surgical mask.”65 
Experts acknowledge, however, that AI has been of limited efficacy in the 
COVID-19 battle thus far. One reason is that AI algorithms require large amounts 
of data for training purposes, and obtaining adequate data can be costly and work-
 
 58. Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, On the Responsible Use of Digital Data to Tackle the 
COVID-19 Pandemic, 26 NATURE MED., 463, 463 (2020). 
 59. Wim Naudé, Artificial Intelligence vs. COVID-19: Limitations, Constraints and Pitfalls, 
35 AI & SOC’Y 761, 761-62 (2020). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Xiangao Jiang et al., Towards an Artificial Intelligence Framework for Data-Driven 
Prediction of Coronavirus Clinical Severity, 63 COMPUTERS, MATERIALS & CONTINUA 537 (2020); 
Naudé, supra note 59, at 762-63. 
 62. Will Douglas Heaven, Israel Is Using AI to Flag High-Risk COVID-19 Patients, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/24/1000543/israel-ai-
prediction-medical-testing-data-high-risk-covid-19-patients. 
 63. Naudé, supra note 59. 
 64. Bo Ram Beck, Bonggun Shin, Yoonjung Choi, Sungsoo Park & Keunsoo Kang, Predicting 
Commercially Available Antiviral Drugs that May Act on the Novel Coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) 
Through a Drug-Target Interaction Deep Learning Model, 18 COMPUTATIONAL & STRUCTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 784 (2020); Justin Stebbing, Anne Phelan, Ivan Griffin, Catherine Tucker, Olly 
Oechsle, Dan Smith & Peter Richardson, COVID-19: Combining Antiviral and Anti-Inflammatory 
Treatments, 20 LANCET 400, 400-01 (2020). 
 65. Andy Chun, In a Time of Coronavirus, China’s Investment in AI Is Paying Off in a Big 
Way, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 18, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/comment/ 
opinion/article/3075553/time-coronavirus-chinas-investment-ai-paying-big-way. 
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intensive.66 Most studies to date have drawn information from small datasets.67 In 
addition, in the United States, patients’ records are often fragmented and located 
at different facilities that do not have interoperable68 EHRs.69 Thus, it could be 
impossible to obtain a sufficiently large and representative patient dataset to allow 
for accurate predictions about disease prognosis.70 In the area of surveillance, 
thermal scanning can be hampered by people wearing eyeglasses “because 
scanning the inner tear duct gives the most reliable indication” of fever from a 
distance.71 
II. DISCRIMINATION-RELATED PITFALLS OF AI 
The above-described problems with employing AI to combat COVID-19 
provide a preview of the shortcomings of AI more generally. AI can often generate 
incorrect results. In some instances, AI defects can have discriminatory effects and 
can severely disadvantage certain groups of patients.72 Flawed outcomes can stem 
from a number of problems. This part focuses on three key problems. First, the 
data themselves can be incomplete or incorrect,73 thus causing measurement 
error.74 Second, the data set that trains the algorithm may be under-inclusive or 
otherwise skewed (e.g., containing records of only White males) so that AI 
outcomes are not generalizable to the population as a whole.75 Third, the training 
data may capture historical patterns of discrimination, causing the algorithm to 
perpetuate the inequitable treatment. This problem is called feedback loop bias.76 
The section also briefly discusses other sources of uncertainty. 
 
 66. Naudé, supra note 59, at 761-63; Don Roedner, Why 96% of Enterprises Face AI Training 
Data Issues, DATACONOMY (July 30, 2019), https://dataconomy.com/2019/07/why-96-of-
enterprises-face-ai-training-data-issues. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Interoperability means “the ability for systems to exchange data and operate in a 
coordinated, seamless manner.” BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS: COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN HEALTH 
CARE AND BIOMEDICINE 952 (Edward H. Shortliffe & James J. Cimino eds., 3d ed. 2006). 
 69. HOFFMAN, supra note 46, at 54-55; see also Heaven, supra note 62. 
 70. Heaven, supra note 62. 
 71. Naudé, supra note 59. 
 72. Ian A. Scott, Hope, Hype and Harms of Big Data, 49 INTERNAL MED. J. 126, 127 (2019). 
 73. Vayena et al., supra note 50, at 2 (discussing “cases in which the data sources themselves 
do not reflect true epidemiology within a given demographic, as for instance in population data biased 
by the entrenched overdiagnosis of schizophrenia in African Americans”). 
 74. Timo B. Brakenhoff, Maarten van Smeden, Frank L.J. Visseren & Rolf H.H. Groenwold, 
Random Measurement Error: Why Worry? An Example of Cardiovascular Risk Factors, PLOS ONE, 
Feb. 2018, art. no. e0192298. 
 75. Vayena et al., supra note 73, at 2 (“Such an algorithm would make poor predictions, for 
example, among younger black women.”). 
 76. David Casacuberta, Bias in a Feedback Loop: Fuelling Algorithmic Injustice, CCCB LAB, 
(May 9, 2018) http://lab.cccb.org/en/bias-in-a-feedback-loop-fuelling-algorithmic-injustice. 
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A. Measurement Errors 
Big data that is used to train machine-learning algorithms can have missing 
and incorrect information.77 Indeed, some patients’ records contain a plethora of 
erroneous and misleading data.78 Measurement errors can be defined as “the 
difference between the [actual] quantity of interest and the measured value.”79 Poor 
data quality inevitably leads to poor AI algorithm performance, sometimes 
expressed as the “garbage in-garbage out” principle.80 
EHRs of minorities and economically disadvantaged individuals might be 
particularly vulnerable to missing data.81 Members of vulnerable populations may 
receive health care infrequently because they are uninsured, have no transportation 
or childcare, or face other barriers.82 They also often lack a primary care physician 
and visit multiple facilities when they do seek medical attention, so that their 
records are fragmented and do not contain comprehensive information.83 Because 
of data gaps, AI may not recognize such patients as having the diseases or health 
risks that the algorithm is designed to identify.84 
Furthermore, low-income individuals may seek care at teaching clinics where 
practitioners are less meticulous about recordkeeping.85 Data gathered from these 
facilities may have more errors than data from facilities frequented by higher-
income patients.86 
B. Selection Bias 
The word “bias” has different meanings in different contexts. Human bias is 
 
 77. Scott, supra note 72, at 127 (discussing numerous potential shortcomings of big data); 
Nilay D. Shah, Ewout W. Steyerberg & David M. Kent, Big Data and Predictive Analytics: 
Recalibrating Expectations, 320 JAMA 27, 28 (2018); Topol, supra note 50, at 51. 
 78. HOFFMAN, supra note 46, at 23-28. 
 79. Jessie K. Edwards & Alexander P. Keil, Measurement Error and Environmental 
Epidemiology: A Policy Perspective, 4 CURRENT ENVTL. HEALTH REP. 79, 79 (2017). 
 80. P. Elliott Miller et al., Predictive Abilities of Machine Learning Techniques May Be 
Limited by Dataset Characteristics: Insights from the UNOS Database, 25 J. CARDIAC FAILURE 479, 
482 (2019) (“Our results raise the notion that large clinical datasets might lack the accuracy and 
granularity needed for machine learning methodologies to uncover unique associations.”); Rajkomar 
et al., supra note 37, at 1355; Kun-Hsing Yu & Isaac S. Kohane, Framing the Challenges of Artificial 
Intelligence in Medicine, 28 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 238, 239 (2019). 
 81. Gianfrancesco et al., supra note 48, at 1545. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1546. 
 86. Id.; Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 867 (providing the example of “predicting the onset 
of clinical depression in environments where protected groups have been systematically 
misdiagnosed”). 
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prejudice or “unreasonably hostile feelings or opinions about a social group.”87 By 
contrast, algorithmic bias is present when an AI model produces results that are 
unintended by its creators because of its training data’s shortcomings or because it 
is applied to an unanticipated patient population.88 
One reason for enthusiasm about AI is the hope that it will diminish human 
bias in health care.89 It is natural for human beings to have certain prejudices rooted 
in their background and upbringing, and this may at times influence diagnosis and 
treatment decisions.90 Objective algorithmic analysis should ideally diminish or 
eliminate human bias.91 However, AI algorithms are subject to their own bias 
problems.92 
Big data can be subject to selection bias. Selection bias can occur if the subset 
of individuals represented in the training data is not representative of the patient 
population of interest.93 If the data used to train a learning algorithm comes from 
a health system that serves particular populations (e.g., disproportionately wealthy 
or low-income people) but not others, the algorithm’s predictions may not be 
generalizable to all patients of interest.94 Several scholars have noted the following: 
Big Data has not captured certain marginalized demographics. 
Particularly concerning are racial minorities, people with low 
socioeconomic status, and immigrants. Many of the people 
missing from the data that come from sources such as Internet 
history, social media presence, and credit-card use are also 
missing from other sources of Big Data, such as electronic health 
records (EHRs) and genomic databases. The factors responsible 
for these gaps are diverse and include lack of insurance and the 
 
 87. Bias, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/bias (last visited May 16, 
2020); see also Parikh et al., supra note 18, at 2377 (“An AI algorithm that learns from historical 
electronic health record (EHR) data and existing practice patterns may not recommend testing for 
cardiac ischemia for an older woman, delaying potentially life-saving treatment.”). 
 88. Irene Y. Chen, Peter Szolovits & Marzyeh Ghassemi, Can AI Help Reduce Disparities in 
General Medical and Mental Health Care?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS E167, E168 (2019); see also Jessica 
K. Paulus & David M. Kent, Predictably Unequal: Understanding and Addressing Concerns that 
Algorithmic Clinical Prediction May Increase Health Disparities, 3 NPJ DIGITAL MED., art. no. 99, 
2020, at 4 (defining algorithmic bias in terms of “issues related to model design, data and sampling 
that may disproportionately affect model performance in a certain subgroup”). 
 89. Gianfrancesco et al., supra note 48, at 1544. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 57-63. 
 93. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is Bigger 
Really Better?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 521-23 (2013) (discussing selection bias). 
 94. Craig Konnoth, Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317, 1361 (2017) 
(asserting that “relying on data that is biased towards certain social groups can have problematic 
effects”). 
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inability to access health care, to name just two . . . .95 
Sadly, many examples of selection bias exist in the health-care field. An 
analysis of 2,511 genome-mapping studies from around the world found that 
eighty-one percent of participants were of European descent.96 A 2014 study found 
that over the prior twenty years the cancer survival gap between White and African 
American patients did not shrink, and the researchers attributed the persistent 
disparity in part to the relative dearth of information about the efficacy of treatment 
in the Black population.97 Unfortunately, African Americans are thirty percent less 
likely than Whites to participate in clinical trials.98 
Selection bias may be particularly acute if the size of the study sample is 
small.99 The sample may contain few if any data subjects who belong to particular 
disadvantaged groups.100 An algorithm may misinterpret a lack of information 
about minorities as a lack of disease burden and consequently generate inaccurate 
predictions for the affected groups.101 
C. Feedback Loop Bias 
Bias can be rooted in historical patterns of discrimination. For example, police 
forces may send more officers to minority neighborhoods because they assume 
that these neighborhoods are crime-ridden.102 With more officers present, the 
police will discover more crimes and make more arrests than in other areas, even 
if there are other locations with an equal or larger amount of crime.103 If the arrest 
figures are fed into an algorithm designed to determine optimal police force 
allocation, the algorithm may learn that it is advisable to send more police to the 
minority neighborhoods because they have more crime than elsewhere. The 
 
 95. Sarah E. Malanga, Jonathan D. Loe, Christopher T. Robertson & Kenneth S. Ramos, Who’s 
Left Out of Big Data? How Big Data Collection, Analysis, and Use Neglect Populations Most in 
Need of Medical and Public Health Research and Interventions, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND 
BIOETHICS 98, 98-99 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Effy Vayena & Urs Gasser eds., 
2018) (footnote omitted). 
 96. Alice B. Popejoy & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Genomics Is Failing on Diversity, 538 NATURE 
161, 162 (2016). 
 97. Ayal A. Aizer et al., Lack of Reduction in Racial Disparities in Cancer-Specific Mortality 
over a 20-Year Period, 120 CANCER 1532, 1538 (2014). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Gianfrancesco et al., supra note 48, at 1545-46. 
 100. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 867. 
 101. Gianfrancesco et al., supra note 48, at 1545-46; A.I. Bias in Healthcare: Human Pride, 
Machine Prejudice, supra note 18 (“[T]hese distorted datasets would be the starting points for A.I. 
development.”). 
 102. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 92; Chouldechova & Roth, supra note 25, at 84. 
 103. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 92. 
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algorithm may thus make a recommendation that will perpetuate discrimination.104 
Likewise, some patients may receive less intensive care because of their 
demographic characteristics rather than because of their medical needs.105 For 
example, one study concluded that women are less likely than men to receive lipid-
lowering medications, in-hospital procedures, and optimal care at hospital 
discharge, even though they are more likely to suffer hypertension and heart 
failure.106 The training data used to develop algorithms relating to these conditions 
typically do not indicate that women received inadequate treatment compared to 
men and should have had additional interventions. Consequently, the algorithm 
will likely learn to recommend less intensive care for women thereby perpetuating 
and exacerbating the undertreatment problem. 
D. Algorithmic Uncertainty 
Medical AI users must accept that AI involves a degree of uncertainty.107 At 
times, the data available for prediction will not completely characterize the class 
of interest.108 Learning algorithms may be affected by incomplete observability of 
relevant data or incomplete modeling because not all observed information is 
considered in the algorithmic analysis.109 
It is often more efficient and practical to use a simple rule with a degree of 
uncertainty rather than a complex one with more certainty. For example, the rule 
“most birds fly” is uncomplicated and highly functional. By contrast, the rule 
“birds fly, except for very young birds that have not yet learned to fly, sick or 
injured birds that have lost the ability to fly, flightless species of birds including 
the cassowary, ostrich and kiwi . . . “ is costly to develop, maintain, and convey 
and will still be vulnerable to failures.110 
A machine-learning algorithm may adopt a simple rule for a given problem 
and data set if it performs adequately on the training data.111 Discrimination may 
occur if all or part of a minority group is mishandled by the rule, which is more 
likely if that group or subgroup is small.112 In the example above, ostriches would 
 
 104. Chouldechova & Roth, supra note 25, at 87 (“[S]ince police are likely to make more arrests 
in more heavily policed areas, using arrest data to predict crime hotspots will disproportionately 
concentrate policing efforts on already over-policed communities.”). 
 105. Gianfrancesco et al., supra note 48, at 1546. 
 106. Shanshan Li et al., Sex and Race/Ethnicity-Related Disparities in Care and Outcomes After 
Hospitalization for Coronary Artery Disease Among Older Adults, 9 CIRCULATION: 
CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY & OUTCOMES S36, S38 (2016). 
 107. GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 32, at 52. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 52-53. 
 110. Id. at 53. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
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potentially suffer discrimination as a result of the rule “most birds fly” because 
their special circumstances would not be addressed.113 
E. Examples of Algorithmic Bias and the Risk of Discrimination in Health Care 
Algorithmic bias can function in unanticipated ways that lead to 
discrimination against particular groups. This concern is not merely hypothetical. 
A widely publicized example is an algorithm commonly used by health 
systems to identify patients who could benefit from “high risk management” and 
who should thus receive special attention.114 The algorithm exhibited significant 
racial bias, and the problem was rooted in its use of past health-care costs as a 
proxy for medical risks or conditions.115 Because racial minorities often face 
health-care access barriers, they frequently spend less money on health care than 
others. Thus, their history of expenditures may not reflect their true health status 
or indicate the care they should have obtained if it were available to them. 
Economically disadvantaged individuals who utilize medical services infrequently 
and at low cost often have acute medical problems such as severe hypertension, 
diabetes, renal failure, anemia, and high cholesterol, which are prevalent in African 
American communities.116 Yet, when the algorithm was deployed, its risk scores 
failed to reveal that African Americans were often sicker than their White 
counterparts who received referrals for special services.117 Thus, the algorithm 
favored Whites over African Americans with greater needs. Flawed algorithms 
were likely used by health systems that served up to 200 million Americans.118 
Winterlight Labs, a Toronto-based startup, built a machine-learning tool to 
distinguish individuals with Alzheimer’s disease from those without the ailment 
based on short samples of their speech in response to a picture-description task.119 
It turned out that the technology was effective only for native English speakers of 
a specific Canadian dialect and that it misdiagnosed others.120 It misinterpreted 
 
 113. GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 32, at 53. 
 114. Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan, Dissecting 
Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 447, 449 
(2019); Charlotte Jee, A Biased Medical Algorithm Favored White People for Health-Care 
Programs, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614626/a-biased-
medical-algorithm-favored-white-people-for-healthcare-programs. 
 115. Obermeyer et al., supra note 114, at 447; Jenna Wiens et al., Diagnosing Bias in Data-
Driven Algorithms for Healthcare, 26 NATURE MED. 25, 25-26 (2020). 
 116. Obermeyer et al., supra note 114, at 447-50. 
 117. Id. at 447, 449. 
 118. Id. at 447. 
 119. Kathleen C. Fraser, Jed A. Meltzer & Frank Rudzicz, Linguistic Features Identify 
Alzheimer’s Disease in Narrative Speech, 49 J. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 407, 407 (2016) (asserting that 
the researchers “obtain[ed] state-of-the-art classification accuracies of over 81% in distinguishing 
individuals with [Alzheimer’s disease] from those without”). 
 120. Dave Gershgorn, If AI Is Going to be the World’s Doctor, It Needs Better Textbooks, 
17
Hoffman and Podgurski: Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Health Care
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 19:3 (2020) 
18 
pauses, mispronunciations, and uncertainty rooted in language barriers as 
indicators of cognitive decline.121 
Two commentators focused on machine learning that created programs to 
analyze images of skin lesions and to distinguish between malignant and benign 
moles.122 They noted that the “patient data are heavily collected from fair-skinned 
populations in the United States, Europe, and Australia.”123 Consequently, they 
worry that the algorithms will not perform well on images of people of color, which 
could lead to misdiagnoses.124 
Even algorithms that learn from accurate, fully representative data can 
inadvertently perpetuate discrimination. Epic, a major vendor of health 
information systems, released an AI tool to help medical practices identify patients 
who are likely to miss appointments.125 The tool, which was built into Epic’s 
EHRs, provided a numerical estimate of no-show likelihood, thereby encouraging 
clinicians to book a second patient into certain slots.126 Because one of the input 
variables was prior no-shows, researchers found that the scores correlated to socio-
economic status.127 People living in poverty tend more often to have transportation 
or childcare problems or difficulty taking time off from work.128 Therefore, when 
they did arrive at appointments, they were more likely to find a second patient 
booked at the same time and to receive rushed and inadequate care regardless of 
the complexity of their health problems.129 
As AI technology comes into even greater use in health care, bias problems 
may well proliferate. Commentators have contemplated numerous other potential 
AI initiatives that could be tainted by bias and perpetuate discrimination.130 To 
illustrate, because African American patients receive, on average, less pain 
treatment than Caucasians, an AI system trained on EHRs might learn to 
recommend lower doses of pain drugs to African American patients regardless of 
their need for relief.131 As a second example, research has shown that African 
 
QUARTZ (Sept. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1367177/if-ai-is-going-to-be-the-worlds-doctor-it-needs-
better-textbooks. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Adelwole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care Disparities in 
Dermatology, 154 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 1247, 1247 (2018). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Sara G. Murray, Robert M. Wachter & Russell J. Cucina, Discrimination by Artificial 
Intelligence in a Commercial Electronic Health Record—A Case Study, HEALTH AFF. (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200128.626576. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See, e.g., Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 867. 
 131. Price, supra note 1. 
18
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss3/1
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
19 
American women with chest pain are less likely to have cardiac catheterizations 
than are White men with the same symptoms.132 An algorithm designed to identify 
patients who should undergo the procedure may well recommend the treatment for 
African American women at an inappropriately low rate.133 Likewise, transgender 
individuals may suffer discrimination if algorithms require a binary sex input that 
accepts only male or female designations.134 Algorithms may generate treatment 
recommendations that are incorrect or a poor fit for their needs and circumstances. 
F. Other Discrimination Risks Associated with AI 
1. Inequitable Deployment of AI 
AI algorithms could perpetuate discrimination in other ways as well. Despite 
the concerns articulated above, AI is beneficial for many patients.135 Sound 
learning algorithms that are free of bias can help doctors make accurate diagnostic 
and treatment decisions.136 For example, they can identify patients at risk of 
complications or poor outcomes so that doctors can tailor their therapies 
accordingly.137 
Yet resource-poor health-care providers that serve largely disadvantaged 
populations may not have the means to obtain and use sophisticated AI 
technology.138 Commentators have noted that “informatics interventions are 
disproportionately available to well-off, educated, young, and urban patients and 
to urban and academic medical centers.”139 Health disparities will be exacerbated 
if low-income, minority, and rural populations are deprived of the benefits of AI 
technology that improve outcomes in other communities.140 
2. Racially Tailored Medicine 
Some learning algorithms deliberately adjust outputs on the basis of race in 
 
 132. Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effects of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommendations 
for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 618 (1999). 
 133. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 869. 
 134. Rachel Metz, AI Software Defines People as Male or Female. That’s a Problem, CNN 
(Nov. 21, 2019, 11:32 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/21/tech/ai-gender-recognition-
problem/index.html. 
 135. See supra Section I.B. 
 136. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 868. 
 139. Tiffany C. Veinot, Hannah Mitchell & Jessica S. Ancker, Good Intentions Are Not Enough: 
How Informatics Interventions Can Worsen Inequality, 25 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1080, 
1081 (2018). 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 27 (including equal allocation of resources in the 
definition of AI fairness). 
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an effort to better tailor therapies to particular populations.141 For example, a recent 
prostate cancer study showed that AI analysis of digital images can detect 
differences in the appearance of cancer between African American and White 
patients.142 Researchers employed a learning algorithm to look for patterns in 
images of both the tumor itself and the tissue outside the tumor, known as the 
stroma.143 They believe that “considering population-specific information . . . has 
the potential to substantially improve accuracy of prognosis and risk stratification 
in . . . [African American] patients with prostate cancer.”144 Similar studies are 
planned with respect to breast cancer.145 
A 2020 New England Journal of Medicine article revealed that many clinical 
algorithms include “race corrections.”146 They do so because their developers 
believe that adjustments are justified by analyses of historical data about patient 
attributes and clinical outcomes.147 The article provides the following examples: 
 An American Heart Association heart failure risk score algorithm assigns 
three extra points to patients identified as “nonblack” so that Black patients 
are categorized as being at lower risk of death. 
 An algorithm designed to assess kidney function reports higher estimated 
glomerular filtration rates for patients identified as Black, suggesting that 
they have better kidney function. 
 The Kidney Donor Risk Index indicates a higher risk of graft failure for 
donors identified as Black, thus marking Black individuals as less suitable 
donors. 
 The Vaginal Birth after Cesarean algorithm predicts a lower likelihood of 
vaginal birth success for African American and Hispanic women who have 
had a previous Cesarean, making it more likely that they will undergo 
further surgeries. 
 An algorithm that predicts the likelihood of kidney stones in emergency 
 
 141. Hersh K. Bhargava et al., Computationally Derived Image Signature of Stromal 
Morphology Is Prognostic of Prostate Cancer Recurrence Following Prostatectomy in African 
American Patients, 26 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 1915, 1915 (2020); Darshali A. Vyas, Leo G. 
Eisenstein & David S. Jones, Hidden in Plain Sight—Reconsidering the Use of Race Correction in 
Clinical Algorithms, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 874 (2020). 
 142. Bhargava et al., supra note 141. 
 143. Id. at 1921 (“[T]his study is the first to show the role of stromal features in prostate 
cancer . . . .”). 
 144. Id. at 1915. 
 145. Case Western Reserve University, AI Reveals Differences in Appearance of Cancer Tissue 
between Racial Populations, EUREKALERT (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.eurekalert.org/ 
pub_releases/2020-03/cwru-ard030520.php. 
 146. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 874. See also Jessica P. Cerdeña, Marie V. Plaisime & 
Jennifer Tsai, From Race-Based to Race-Conscious Medicine: How Anti-Racist Uprisings Call Us 
to Act, 396 LANCET 1125, 1125-27 (2020). 
 147. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 879. 
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room patients with flank pain adds three points out of a possible thirteen 
to nonblack patients, thus assessing Black patients as less likely to have 
kidney stones.148 
All of these algorithmic outcomes could divert resources away from African 
American patients or otherwise disadvantage them.149 
Paying attention to population differences can potentially enable physicians 
to treat patients more effectively. The prostate cancer researchers discussed above 
aim to predict cancer recurrence more accurately and thus to determine which 
patients should receive aggressive therapies.150 The developers of the other 
algorithms listed above believe that they are enhancing the accuracy of diagnoses 
and treatment recommendations based on empirical evidence.151 Indeed, renowned 
studies, such as the Framingham Heart Study, which established now widely 
accepted risk factors for heart disease, have been criticized for lacking diverse 
study populations.152 The Framingham Heart study derived its data from a small, 
middle-class town in Massachusetts with a predominantly White population of 
Western European descent.153 Subsequent studies have explored racial/ethnic 
differences in cardiovascular disease and its risk factors and found that population-
specific insights are informative for purposes of implementing preventive care.154 
Nevertheless, racially tailored medicine carries its own serious risks,155 and 
 
 148. Id. at 874-79; see also Neil R. Powe, Black Kidney Function Matters: Use or Misuse of 
Race?, 324 JAMA 737, 737 (2020); Keith Churchwell et al., Call to Action: Structural Racism as a 
Fundamental Driver of Health Disparities: A Presidential Advisory from the American Heart 
Association, 142 CIRCULATION e1, e11 (2020) (urging the American Heart Association to “reconsider 
when and how to include race/ethnicity and social determinants measures in risk calculators”); James 
A. Diao et al., Clinical Implications of Removing Race From Estimates of Kidney Function, JAMA 
(Dec. 2, 2020), doi:10.1001/jama.2020.22124 (noting that many U.S. medical centers are abandoning 
the algorithmic race adjustment for kidney function and that doing so may increase chronic kidney 
disease diagnoses among Black adults and improve access to care but may also exclude certain 
kidney donors and impact drug therapies). 
 149. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 874 (“Many of these race-adjusted algorithms guide 
decisions in ways that may direct more attention or resources to white patients than to members of 
racial and ethnic minorities”). 
 150. Case Western Reserve University, supra note 145. 
 151. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 879 (explaining that “researchers followed defensible 
empirical logic,” adjusting for race in their models after performing regression analyses on clinical 
data sets and finding that “minority patients routinely have different health outcomes from white 
patients”). 
 152. Sandeep Jauhar, Opinion, The Heart Disease Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/opinion/sunday/the-heart-disease-conundrum.html 
(“Framingham risk models do not tell the whole story for nonwhite ethnic groups.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Crystel M. Gijsberts et al., Race/Ethnic Differences in the Associations of the 
Framingham Risk Factors with Carotid IMT and Cardiovascular Events, PLOS ONE, July, 2015, art. 
no. e0132321, at 2. 
 155. See generally Sharona Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. 
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some institutions have ceased using algorithms that adjust for race.156 First, race157 
in scientific studies is generally determined through subjects’ self-reported 
identification.158 Yet, millions of Americans are of mixed race.159 They currently 
constitute up to 6.9 percent of the population,160 and experts project that their 
number will triple by 2060.161 Individuals may identify as being of a particular race 
but have a multi-racial background or even appear to be of different ancestry.162 
Counting such persons as members of a single race could skew research results. 
Second, treating physicians attempting to apply algorithmically generated 
diagnostic or treatment recommendations may face a conundrum when their 
patients are of mixed background.163 If the guidelines are different depending on 
ancestry, which ones should a doctor use for a patient who is multiracial?164 
Third, differences that are perceived as “racial” in truth are sometimes 
socioeconomic.165 For example, the health status of some (but certainly not all) 
African American patients might be affected by poverty or stress.166 It would thus 
be inappropriate to make generalizations about all African Americans, and instead, 
researchers should focus on the impact of financial resources or emotional 
wellbeing.167 
Fourth, so-called racial distinctions may in reality be genetic differences.168 A 
 
REV. 395 (2005). 
 156. Powe, supra note 148, at 737 (“A number of institutions have taken steps to remove the 
use of race in equations involving estimated glomerular filtration rates (eGFRs).”). 
 157. Race is in itself a problematic term and is widely perceived as a social construct. See 
Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for “Race” as a Legal Concept, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 1093 
(2004). We prefer more precise terms such as color, ancestry, national origin, and others. Id. at 1159. 
We refer to race here because that is the language used in the relevant scientific studies. 
 158. Bhargava et al., supra note 141, at 1916 (“Patient race was self-reported.”). 
 159. Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Rich Morin & Mark Hugo Lopez, Chapter 2: 
Counting Multiracial Americans, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2015), https:// 
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/chapter-2-counting-multiracial-americans (finding that 
“6.9% of Americans 18 or older have a multiracial background” but noting that only “2.1% of adult 
Americans . . . said they were [of] two or more races in the Census Bureau’s 2013 American 
Community Survey”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Marisa Franco, What Racial Discrimination Will Look Like in 2060, SCI. AM. BLOGS (Nov. 
29, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/what-racial-discrimination-will-look-like-in-
2060. 
 162. Nicholas Vargas & Kevin Stainback, Documenting Contested Racial Identities Among 
Self-Identified Latina/os, Asians, Blacks, and Whites, 60 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 442, 442 (2016). 
 163. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 880 (“Guidelines are silent on such issues—an indication of 
their inadequacy.”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Vyas et al., supra note 141 at 879-80. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Hoffman, supra note 155, at 419-21 (providing the examples of cystic fibrosis, sickle 
cell anemia, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations that are associated with breast and ovarian 
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particular genetic mutation that affects disease vulnerability or treatment response 
might be more common in one racial group than in others.169 Nevertheless, many 
members of the race in question will not have the genetic abnormality while some 
people with different ancestries will.170 For example, sickle cell anemia affects not 
only African Americans, but also people with ancestors from Greece, Sicily, and 
the Arabian Peninsula, and it is not prevalent among Black South Africans.171 
Indeed, experts note that there are more genetic variations within racial groups than 
among them.172 Consequently, algorithms that treat all patients identified as being 
of a particular race the same could provide numerous individuals with inadequate 
and inappropriate care and severely exacerbate health disparities.173 
Fifth, racially tailored medicine raises concerns about stigmatization and 
discrimination.174 Research findings that emphasize biological differences among 
racial populations may convey the message that some racial groups are biologically 
inferior to others.175 For example, minorities might be seen as more diseased than 
non-minority patients if they are deemed more vulnerable to the recurrence of 
certain cancers.176 Publicity about racially tailored research in the popular press 
could fuel the fires of prejudice and discrimination. 
III. LITIGATING DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Algorithmic discrimination can hurt patients and exacerbate health disparities. 
Aggrieved individuals may seek compensation through litigation. Patients who 
suffer harm during the course of their diagnosis or treatment can turn to tort 
theories, regardless of whether AI was involved.177 For example, they might sue 
 
cancer, all of which are common in particular populations but not exclusive to them). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Hoffman, supra note 155, at 419; Ambroise Wonkam et al., The Burden of Sickle Cell 
Disease in Cape Town, 102 S. AFR. MED. J. 752, 752 (2012) (South Africa has a low incidence of 
sickle cell disease”). 
 172. Vyas et al., supra note 141 at 879. 
 173. Id. at 879-80 (urging clinicians who employ race-adjusting algorithms to “be thoughtful 
and deliberate users”). 
 174. Hoffman, supra note 155, at 421-24. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Alex Tsodikov et al., Is Prostate Cancer Different in Black Men? Answers from Three 
Natural History Models, 123 CANCER 2312, 2312 (2017) (“Black race has been identified as an 
independent prognostic factor for disease recurrence in multiple reports . . . .”); Case Western 
Reserve University, supra note 145 (“This new work on prostate cancer builds on mounting evidence 
that clear biological differences between races can be discovered at a cellular level”). 
 177. Megan Sword, To Err is Both Human and Non-Human, 88 UMKC L. REV. 211, 219-21 
(2019); Shailin Thomas, Artificial Intelligence, Medical Malpractice, and the End of Defensive 
Medicine, PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH (Jan. 26, 2017), http://blogs.harvard.edu/ 
billofhealth/2017/01/26/artificial-intelligence-medical-malpractice-and-the-end-of-defensive-
medicine (“As algorithms improve and doctors use them more for diagnosing and decision-making, 
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physicians and hospitals for medical malpractice or vendors for a device’s design 
defects.178 The topic of AI and tort litigation has been addressed elsewhere and is 
beyond the scope of this Article.179 
This work’s contribution is to focus specifically on discrimination claims. If 
plaintiffs wish to challenge discriminatory algorithms and to have them eliminated 
or corrected, their most direct route is discrimination theory. 
Presumably, health-care providers will use AI in good faith and trust that the 
technology will improve health-care outcomes. If they do not or they act with 
deliberate indifference to AI’s discriminatory effects, they could face intentional 
discrimination claims. However, as demonstrated in Part II, AI can sometimes lead 
to unintentional discrimination when seemingly neutral algorithms disadvantage 
particular groups. In such cases, the applicable discrimination principle is disparate 
impact. This Part explores the theory of disparate impact and its significant 
limitations in the health-care field. It explains why disparate impact is unlikely to 
be a fruitful litigation path for plaintiffs aggrieved by AI outcomes. It also 
addresses potential litigation alleging intentional discrimination. 
A. Disparate Impact 
The disparate impact theory has developed most fully in the employment 
arena. We therefore begin with a discussion of employment discrimination 
litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and briefly address 
housing discrimination caselaw before tackling disparate impact as applied to 
health care. 
1. What Is Disparate Impact? 
The disparate impact theory enables plaintiffs to prove discrimination without 
 
the traditional malpractice notions of physician negligence and recklessness may become harder to 
apply.”). 
 178. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black Box Medicine, in BIG DATA, 
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS, supra note 95, at 295, 300 (“Providers . . . could be held liable for 
harmful use of black-box medical algorithms depending on the prevailing customary practice and the 
extent that custom is considered dispositive.”); Nicolas Terry, Of Regulating Healthcare AI and 
Robots, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 133, 162-63 (2019) (describing several “very 
difficult” questions relating to potential product liability litigation involving AI); Saurabh Jha, Can 
You Sue an Algorithm for Malpractice? It Depends, STAT (Mar. 9, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/09/can-you-sue-artificial-intelligence-algorithm-for-
malpractice. 
 179. See A. Michael Froomkin, Ian Kerr & Joelle Pineau, When AIs Outperform Doctors: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 
33, 35-36 (2019); Efthimios Parasidis, Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal 
Framework, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 183, 218-25 (2018); Price, supra note 178. 
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proving intent to discriminate.180 Title VII, which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, empowers 
aggrieved parties to bring disparate impact cases against employers.181 The seminal 
Supreme Court disparate impact ruling came in the 1971 Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. case.182 Griggs was a class action in which African American plaintiffs 
successfully challenged an employer’s requirement of a high school diploma or 
passing a standardized general intelligence test for purposes of being hired or 
transferring to a better job.183 The employer could not prove that the two 
requirements were related to satisfactory job performance, and both 
disproportionately disqualified African Americans.184 
Underlying the Title VII disparate impact theory is the premise that “some 
employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may 
in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”185 Advocates 
can use the disparate impact theory to challenge not only standardized testing by 
employers, but also other practices that are not job-related and systematically 
disadvantage members of a class that is protected under the civil rights laws.186 
Examples are employers’ exclusion of workers with criminal records, which 
adversely affect African Americans and Hispanics,187 and strength tests, which 
have an adverse impact on women.188 
The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits housing discrimination based on color, 
disability, familial status, national origin, race, religion, and sex, also enables 
private parties to litigate disparate impact cases.189 In the 2015 case of Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
 
 180. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 702 
(2006). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018). 
 182. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). 
 183. Id. at 425-26 (1971). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 186. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (referring to any “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their 
face, and even neutral in terms of intent” that “operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior 
discriminatory employment practices”). 
 187. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2012-1, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/ 
enforcement-guidance-consideration-arrest-and-conviction-records-employment-decisions#V (We 
are referring specifically to Part V, entitled “Disparate Impact Discrimination and Criminal 
Records.”). 
 188. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-2007-2, EMPLOYMENT TESTS 
AND SELECTION PROCEDURES (2007), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/employment-tests-and-
selection-procedures. 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018). 
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Inc., the plaintiff asserted that the Department’s allocation of low income housing 
tax credits had a disparate impact on African American residents.190 The Supreme 
Court confirmed that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair 
Housing Act.191 
One would think that plaintiffs would likewise be able to apply the disparate 
impact theory to health-care practices, such as AI use, that disproportionately 
disadvantage women or racial minority groups. An algorithm is typically facially 
neutral but it could affect various populations differently because of design defects 
or flawed training data.192 Under current law, however, the disparate impact theory 
does not furnish the majority of private parties with a suitable litigation tool in 
health-care cases. 
2. Title VI 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits programs receiving federal 
financial assistance from engaging in discrimination based on race, color, or 
national origin.193 Title VI regulations clarify that covered entities may not use 
“criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination.”194 The regulations thus forbid practices that have a 
disparate impact on protected groups.195 Health-care entities such as hospitals and 
nursing homes receiving payments from the federal programs Medicare and 
Medicaid, as most do, are covered by Title VI.196 
Title VI is enforced both by the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
(HHS) Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and by private litigation, but to limited 
effect.197 Civil rights advocates have criticized OCR for not enforcing Title VI 
aggressively enough.198 In addition, in 2001, the Supreme Court foreclosed the 
possibility of disparate impact litigation by private parties.199 In Alexander v. 
Sandoval, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce the 
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI.200 Consequently, private 
parties can pursue only claims of intentional discrimination associated with AI, 
and OCR has sole authority to handle AI-related disparate impact violations 
 
 190. 576 U.S. 519, 519 (2015). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra Sections II.A-E. 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018). 
 194. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2020); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2020). 
 195. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2020); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (2020). 
 196. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT SAFETY, AND 
LIABILITY 385 (8th ed. 2018). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001). 
 200. Id. 
26
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss3/1
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
27 
relating to race, color, or national origin.201 
3. Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act 
Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability 
in particular health programs or activities.202 In describing the protected classes, 
the statute refers to individuals protected by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (addressing sex 
discrimination), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (addressing 
disability discrimination), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.203 
The provision covers health programs or activities that receive federal 
financial assistance or that the federal government administers.204 These generally 
include “hospitals, health clinics, health insurance issuers, state Medicaid 
agencies, community health centers, physician’s practices and home health care 
agencies.”205 Note that HHS maintains that funds provided under Medicare Part B 
(which pays for physicians’ services) do not constitute federal financial assistance, 
so some physicians may not be bound by the Section 1557 antidiscrimination 
mandate.206 However, the statute applies to doctors receiving Medicaid payments 
and other forms of financial support, so the majority of physicians are covered.207 
For purposes of this Article, a particularly important question is whether 
Section 1557 allows for disparate impact claims. The relevant statutory language 
is, “The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title VI, 
title IX, section 794, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of 
violations of this subsection.”208 Could racial minorities who are 
disproportionately disadvantaged by an AI algorithm assert disparate impact 
claims under Section 1557 while the theory is unavailable under Title VI? The 
 
 201. Our research did not reveal any AI-related disparate impact cases that were pursued by 
OCR thus far. 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). 
 203. Id. (“[A]n individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 
1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 794 of title 
29, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .”). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Section 1557: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/1557faqs/index.html (last reviewed 
May 18, 2017). 
 206. FURROW ET AL., supra note 196, at 416; Section 1557: Frequently Asked Questions, supra 
note 205. 
 207. FURROW ET AL., supra note 196, at 416. 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). 
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question of private litigation of disparate impact allegations under Section 1557 
has generated considerable controversy. 
A former HHS regulation establishes that aggrieved individuals have a private 
right of action under Section 1557.209 Under the Obama administration, HHS stated 
that it “interprets Section 1557 as authorizing a private right of action for claims 
of disparate impact discrimination . . . .”210 
In Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, the plaintiff alleged that he received 
inferior care because he was a transgender man, in violation of Section 1557.211 A 
district court ruled that Congress intended to create a new cause of action for 
discrimination in health care that is independent of the enforcement mechanisms 
for the statutes listed in Section 1557 (Title VI, Title IX, the Age Discrimination 
Act, and the Rehabilitation Act).212 Based on this holding, Section 1557 plaintiffs 
could bring both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.213 According to 
the Rumble court, the fact that Title VI or Title IX is understood to ban disparate 
impact cases would not constitute an obstacle for plaintiffs bringing disparate 
impact claims under Section 1557.214 
Other courts, however, have disagreed. In Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., a district court held that Section 
1557 does not permit private litigation of disparate impact claims related to race.215 
The case involved allegations that Gilead’s pricing scheme for its Hepatitis C drugs 
disproportionately disadvantaged racial minorities and low-income patients in 
violation of Section 1557.216 The court emphasized the statute’s incorporation of 
“the enforcement mechanisms” of the other civil rights statutes.217 It thus 
concluded that the plain language of the law reveals that Congress adopted Title 
VI’s exclusion of disparate impact claims in Section 1557.218 
Several district courts have held that Section 1557 also precludes individuals’ 
disparate impact claims for sex discrimination claimants.219 This is because Title 
 
 209. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,472 (May 
18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 92.302(d)). 45 C.F.R. § 92.302 was later repealed by 
Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of Authority, 
85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,201-04 (June 19, 2020). 
 210. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,440. 
 211. No. 14-CV-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015). 
 212. Id. at *11. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.; see infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX). 
 215. 102 F. Supp. 3d 688, 698-701 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 216. Id. at 693, 695. 
 217. Id. at 698; see 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018) (“The enforcement mechanisms provided for 
and available under such title VI, title IX, section 794, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply 
for purposes of violations of this subsection.”). 
 218. Gilead, 102 F.Supp.3d at 701. 
 219. See Weinreb v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC Health & Welfare Plan, 323 F. Supp. 3d 501, 521 
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IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 does not permit private litigation of sex 
discrimination claims based on disparate impact.220 
To date, there appears to have been no Section 1557 disparate impact cases 
filed for age discrimination.221 However, as in the case of Title VI and Title IX, 
private litigation of disparate impact claims is precluded by the Age Discrimination 
Act of 1975, which is referenced in Section 1557.222 Thus, most courts would likely 
reject age-related disparate impact claims under Section 1557. 
With respect to disability, there is less certainty. The Sixth Circuit held that 
Section 1557 prohibits disparate impact claims by disability discrimination 
litigants because it has interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which Section 
1557 incorporates, as barring such claims.223 By contrast, other circuits have found 
that disparate impact claims are viable under the Rehabilitation Act and thus would 
likely hold that the same is true for Section 1557.224 
The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the matter of disparate impact claims 
under Section 1557. However, in June 2020, the Trump administration enacted a 
regulation explicitly establishing that Section 1557 adopts the enforcement 
mechanisms of each of the statutes that it incorporates.225 This rule prevents almost 
all plaintiffs from pursuing disparate impact challenges under Section 1557. 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed, No. 18-2809 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2018); Condry v. UnitedHealth Grp., 
Inc., No. 17-cv-00183-VC, 2018 WL 3203046, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2018) (“[D]isparate impact 
claims on the basis of sex are not cognizable under section 1557.”), appeal filed, No. 20-16857 (9th 
Cir. Sept. 24, 2020); Briscoe v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 725, 738 (N.D. Ill. 2017); 
York v. Wellmark, Inc., No. 4:16-cv-00627-RGE-CFB, 2017 WL 11261026, at *15-16 (S.D. Iowa 
Sept. 6, 2017), aff’d, 965 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 220. Weinreb, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 521; Briscoe, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 739. 
 221. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, 84 Fed. Reg. 
27,846, 27,851 n.22 (proposed June 14, 2019) (“To the Department’s knowledge, no disparate impact 
claims on the basis of age have been filed under Section 1557 in a Federal court.”). 
 222. Kamps v. Baylor Univ., 592 F. App’x. 282, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 223. Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 242 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 224. See Ga. State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1428 (11th Cir. 
1985) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.4); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. Unit A 
Nov. 1981); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (“[W]e assume without deciding 
that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the 
handicapped.”). 
 225. HHS Finalizes Rule on Section 1557 Protecting Civil Rights in Healthcare, Restoring the 
Rule of Law, and Relieving Americans of Billions in Excessive Costs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES (June 12, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/12/hhs-finalizes-rule-section-
1557-protecting-civil-rights-healthcare.html. This rule further asserted that the government will 
interpret the term “sex” in the Section 1557 context as encompassing only male or female “as 
determined by biology.” Id. However, in June of 2020, in Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme 
Court held that for purposes of Title VII, the term “sex” covers sexual orientation and gender identity. 
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). This decision may well impact other areas of the law and change future 
interpretations of Section 1557. 
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B. Intentional Discrimination 
In extreme cases, plaintiffs may sue health-care providers for intentional 
discrimination that is related to AI.226 For example, if malevolent health-care 
providers deliberately create algorithms that will disadvantage minority patients 
and then use them as justifications to undertreat those individuals, they may be 
liable for intentional discrimination. 
In addition, courts have determined that deliberate indifference can constitute 
intentional discrimination under the civil rights laws.227 In order to prove deliberate 
indifference, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual knowledge of 
the alleged discrimination and the ability to redress it but failed to do so.228 Thus, 
for example, if health-care providers become aware that their AI disproportionately 
deprives minority patients of referrals to high-risk management programs or 
underestimates their risk of contracting serious diseases and do not intervene to 
rectify the problem,229 they could face intentional discrimination claims under Title 
VI or Section 1557. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING LEGAL INTERVENTIONS 
AI oversight requires a multi-faceted approach that involves many 
stakeholders.230 Private litigants, AI developers, AI users, and the government all 
have a role to play in promoting algorithmic fairness.231 This Part recommends 
three forms of legal interventions to address AI discrimination problems. The first 
is a private cause of action for disparate impact.232 The second is a quality control 
mandate in the form of an algorithmic accountability act.233 The third, addressed 
 
 226. See supra notes 201 and 209 and accompanying text (discussing litigation rights under 
Title VI and Section 1557). 
 227. Sunderland v. Bethesda Hosp., Inc., 686 F. Appx. 807, 815 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding 
that a jury could find that the defendant-hospital acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act when it relied on a malfunctioning video-remote-interpreting device to 
communicate with a deaf patient despite the patient’s complaints and requests for an alternative 
method of accommodation); Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“[D]eliberate indifference may, in certain circumstances, establish intentional discrimination for the 
purposes of a Title VI claim.”); S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262 
(3d Cir. 2013) (noting that appellate courts have “held that deliberate indifference satisfies the 
requisite showing of intentional discrimination”). 
 228. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 273 (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629, 645-49 (1999)). 
 229. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118, 146-148. 
 230. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 124. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See infra Section IV.A. 
 233. See infra Section IV.B. 
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briefly, is FDA regulation.234 
A. Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact Discrimination in Health Care 
Most if not all medical AI algorithm developers are well-intentioned and strive 
in good faith to improve human health through their work.235 Nevertheless, 
algorithms can generate discriminatory outcomes.236 This is a classic example of 
disparate impact, or unintentional discrimination.237 Assume a physician applies 
an algorithm to help diagnose all patients with particular symptoms. The algorithm 
is thus a facially neutral mechanism, and the physician has no intention of 
discriminating against any patients. However, if the algorithm nevertheless 
disproportionately disadvantage a particular population, its use may be 
unlawful.238 
As in the case of other disparate impact claims, defendants would not be liable 
for discrimination if their use of an algorithm is justified by business necessity, 
such as when an algorithm truly helps doctors make sound treatment decisions.239 
Thus, if an algorithm is shown consistently to improve the accuracy of disease 
prognosis and treatment choice, its use is permissible. This is true even if the 
algorithm leads clinicians to make different decisions for people with different 
demographics.240 
The Fair Housing Act, Title VII, and other employment discrimination laws 
permit private litigants to pursue disparate impact claims in the areas of housing 
and the workplace.241 For example, in DeHoyos v. Allstate Corp., the plaintiffs 
brought a class action to challenge Allstate’s credit-scoring system under the Fair 
Housing Act and other laws because it caused African American and Hispanic 
customers to pay higher insurance premiums than White customers.242 In Muñoz 
 
 234. See infra Section IV.C. 
 235. See supra Section I.B (discussing the benefits of AI). 
 236. See supra Section II.E (providing examples of algorithmic bias). 
 237.See supra Section III.A. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text (discussing employment discrimination 
litigation). 
 240.See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text (discussing a cancer study that focused on 
differences between African American and White patients). 
 241. See Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 200-05 (2005) (discussing disparate impact under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); Questions and Answers on EEOC Final Rule on Disparate Impact 
and “Reasonable Factors Other Than Age” Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
regulations/questions-and-answers-eeoc-final-rule-disparate-impact-and-reasonable-factors-other-
age (last visited July 7, 2020). 
 242. 240 F.R.D. 269, 275 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (seeking final approval of a proposed settlement); 
see also Rodriguez v. Bear Stearns Cos., No. 07-cv-1816 (JCH), 2009 WL 995865, at *7 (D. Conn. 
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v. Orr, a class of Hispanic males sued the U.S. Air Force under Title VII to 
challenge its civilian employee promotion system, which involved an algorithm.243 
In the era of AI and “black-box medicine,” it is irrational to prohibit plaintiffs 
from pursuing such claims in the health-care arena. Government enforcement of 
disparate impact cases alone is inadequate because it depends on political 
priorities, which may disfavor civil rights cases, and on resources, which are often 
scarce.244 
Consequently, it is useful to adopt private enforcement as an adjunct to 
government oversight and an incentive for statutory compliance. To that end, 
Congress should amend existing civil rights legislation to explicitly bar disparate 
impact discrimination and add private rights of action for aggrieved individuals. 
While we are not the first to suggest it,245 this approach is now ripe for 
reconsideration. 
1. Amending Title VI and Other Long-Standing Civil Rights Statutes 
In 2008, the late Congressman John Lewis (D-GA) and Senator Edward 
Kennedy (D-MA) proposed the Civil Rights Act of 2008.246 The findings section 
of the bill states that “[t]he Sandoval decision contradicts settled expectations 
created by title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 . . . , the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 . . . , and section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . .”247 The findings further state, 
emphatically, that administrative enforcement alone could not achieve compliance 
with the antidiscrimination laws and that enforcement by “private attorneys 
general” is vital.248 
The Civil Rights Act of 2008 would have amended Title VI, Title IX, and the 
Age Discrimination Act of 1975 to prohibit “[d]iscrimination (including exclusion 
from participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact.”249 The bill 
noted that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 already covers disparate impact and 
 
Apr. 14, 2009) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims “that defendants’ predatory 
servicing practices disproportionately harmed minority borrowers”). 
 243. 200 F.3d 291, 292 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing a discovery dispute regarding plaintiffs’ 
access to the algorithm). 
 244. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text; see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health 
Care, Title VI, and Racism’s New Normal, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 3, 56 (2014) 
(“The public-private litigation model has historically proved to be an indispensable weapon in the 
attack against subtle and complex racial discrimination.”). 
 245. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 246. See Civil Rights Act of 2008, S. 2554, 110th Cong. (2008); Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 
5129, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 247. S. 2554 § 101(2). 
 248. Id. § 101(3). 
 249.Id. § 102(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2). 
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allows private parties to litigate disparate impact claims.250 
The proposed bill also added an explicit right of action for any violation of the 
statute, including the disparate impact provisions.251 However, the bill specified 
that in disparate impact cases, aggrieved individuals could recover only equitable 
relief, attorney’s fees, and costs.252 A finding of liability would thus require 
defendants to correct the AI problem but inflict limited financial pain. 
The bill did not pass,253 but its aspirations were not forgotten. Professor Dayna 
Bowen Matthew renewed the call for a Title VI amendment in a 2014 article.254 
Professor Matthew emphasizes the importance of combined private and 
governmental enforcement efforts and of empowering victims of implicit bias to 
seek redress for the harms they have suffered.255 The only vehicle for doing so is a 
private right of action for disparate impact claims. Under Matthew’s proposal, as 
under the proposed 2008 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs would be able to recover only 
equitable remedies, including attorneys’ fees and costs in disparate impact cases.256 
Professor Matthew asserts that legislative history reveals that “[f]rom its 
inception, health care equity has been at the core of the legislative purpose for Title 
VI.”257 A private disparate impact cause of action would thus restore the law to its 
original purpose.258 Now algorithmic bias threatens to exacerbate health disparities 
as clinicians increasingly rely on AI. This is an opportune time to reinvigorate 
efforts to promote health equity and bolster civil rights enforcement. 
2. Amending Section 1557 of the ACA 
The Civil Rights Act of 2008 would have ensured that Section 1557 would 
allow private litigants to assert disparate impact claims.259 Objections to such a 
right of action are based on Section 1557’s reference to Title VI, Title IX, and the 
Age Discrimination Act, which have been deemed to preclude disparate impact 
litigation by private parties.260 A new law explicitly adding such a right of action 
to those civil rights statutes would sweep away arguments about Section 1557’s 
limited scope of litigation rights. 
Admittedly, however, amending Title VI would dramatically impact all 
 
 250. Id. § 101(9). 
 251. Id. § 103(a)(2), (b)(2), (c). 
 252. Id. § 104. 
 253. Govtrack, H.R. 5129 (110th): Civil Rights Act of 2008, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr5129 (last visited Dec. 9, 2020).. 
 254. See Matthew, supra note 244, at 54-58. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 55. 
 257. Id. at 12. 
 258. Id. at 61. 
 259. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 260. See supra Section III.A. 
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programs receiving federal financial assistance and thus reach well beyond health 
care.261 If Congress wishes to implement a more modest legislative intervention 
than the Civil Rights Act of 2008, it could amend Section 1557.262 Congress could 
add language that plainly states that aggrieved individuals can assert disparate 
impact claims under the statute.263 This would limit the scope of reform to health-
care cases only, whereas the Civil Rights Act of 2008 would have been much 
broader.264 In the absence of such an amendment, civil rights advocates can urge 
the Biden administration to reverse the Trump administration rule265 and hope that 
more courts will follow Rumble v. Fairview Health Services in interpreting Section 
1557.266 
B. The Algorithmic Accountability Act 
A different legislative pathway is the enactment of a law that establishes 
oversight for algorithms and promotes AI integrity. To that end, Senators Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY) 
introduced the “Algorithmic Accountability Act” in the 116th Congress on April 
10, 2019.267 
The bill is rooted in concern about discrimination. Its sponsors issued a press 
release in which Senator Wyden stated that “[I]nstead of eliminating bias, too 
often . . . algorithms depend on biased assumptions or data that can actually 
reinforce discrimination against women and people of color.”268 Accordingly, the 
purpose of the bill is to “require[] companies to study the algorithms they use, 
identify bias in these systems and fix any discrimination or bias they find.”269 
1. The Statutory Requirements 
The bill would do the following: 
 Authorize the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to formulate regulations 
requiring covered entities to conduct impact assessments of highly 
 
 261. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 262. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2018). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 265. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 266. No. 14-CV-2037 (SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015); see 
supra text accompanying notes 211-214. 
 267. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); Algorithmic 
Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019); Press Release, U.S. Senator Cory 
Booker of N.J., Booker, Wyden, Clarke Introduce Bill Requiring Companies to Target Bias in 
Corporate Algorithms, (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-wyden-
clarke-introduce-bill-requiring-companies-to-target-bias-in-corporate-algorithms. 
 268. Press Release, U.S. Senator Cory Booker of N.J., supra note 267. 
 269. Id. 
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sensitive automated decision systems. 
 Require covered entities to evaluate their use of automated decision 
systems and their training data in order to determine if there are problems 
related to accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy or security. 
 Require covered entities to assess the extent to which their information 
systems protect data subjects’ privacy and ensure data security. 
 Require covered entities to address any problems they discover during the 
impact assessments.270 
A covered entity is any person, partnership, or corporation that is subject to 
FTC regulations and earns more than $50 million annually, possesses or controls 
personal information from at least one million people or consumer devices, or 
primarily acts as a data broker that acquires, processes, and sells consumer data.271 
In its current form, the bill therefore would not reach many health-care 
providers.272 
2. Critique of the Bill 
Many hailed the Algorithmic Accountability Act as a positive first step in 
promoting algorithmic fairness.273 But others voiced opposition to the bill and 
highlighted several shortcomings.274 
First, the bill applies only to large or high-revenue companies, and thus 
smaller companies would remain unregulated with respect to AI use.275 Second, 
the bill relies exclusively on the FTC for enforcement, and consumer advocates 
argue that the agency’s enforcement activities are often anemic.276 Third, it does 
not require input from diverse stakeholders for purposes of impact assessment.277 
In fact, it states that companies should consult with external third parties, such as 
 
 270. S. 1108 §§ 2(2), 2(6), 3(b); Press Release, U.S. Senator Cory Booker of N.J., supra note 
267. 
 271. S. 1108 § 2(5). 
 272. Id.; MARKUS H. MEIER, BRADLEY S. ALBERT & KARA MONAHAN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
OVERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1 (2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/overview_health_ 
care_june_2019.pdf (explaining that the FTC’s “Health Care Division consists of approximately 40 
lawyers and investigators who work exclusively on health care antitrust matters,” implying that the 
FTC has regulatory power over health-care entities). 
 273. Kaminski & Selbst, supra note 12. 
 274. Id.; Joshua New, How to Fix the Algorithmic Accountability Act, CTR. FOR DATA 
INNOVATION (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/09/how-to-fix-the-algorithmic-
accountability-act. 
 275. S. 1108 § 2(5); New, supra note 274. 
 276. Kaminski & Selbst, supra note 12. 
 277. Id. 
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“independent auditors or technology experts,” only “if reasonably possible.”278 
Fourth, the bill does not mandate that the public have any access to impact 
assessment outcomes.279 If the proposal directed the FTC to produce annual 
summary reports with de-identified assessment information, it could potentially 
provide the public with valuable data while safeguarding industry interests in 
proprietary information.280 Other criticisms include regulatory overreach, lack of 
definitional clarity, and insufficient guidance, among other alleged 
shortcomings.281 
3. Moving Forward 
The proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act did not become law.282 
However, at least a couple of local jurisdictions have begun to focus attention on 
the integrity of AI practices. In 2017, the New York City Council established a 
task force to formulate recommendations for promoting public accountability with 
respect to the city’s algorithm use.283 The task force issued its report in November 
of 2019.284 The report emphasizes the importance of “[p]romoting fairness, equity, 
accountability, and transparency in the use” of automated-decision systems.285 In 
2019, legislators in Washington State held a hearing on an algorithmic 
accountability bill that would establish guidelines for the state government’s 
“procurement and use of automated decision systems.”286 
In order to establish a national standard for algorithmic fairness, Congress 
should persist in its efforts to pass AI-oversight legislation. A national solution 
would be preferable to local solutions because AI use is widespread and crosses 
state borders.287 Both health-care providers and AI vendors often operate in 
 
 278. Id. (quoting S. 1108 § 3(b)(1)(C)). 
 279. Kaminski & Selbst, supra note 12; New, supra note 274. 
 280. Kaminski & Selbst, supra note 12. 
 281. New, supra note 274. 
 282. S. 1108: Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/116/s1108 (last visited June 3, 2020). 
 283. Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, City Council Passes First Bill in Nation to 
Address Transparency, Bias in Government Use of Algorithms (Dec. 11, 2017), https:// 
www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/city-council-passes-first-bill-nation-address-transparency-bias-
government-use. 
 284. N.Y.C. AUTOMATED DECISION SYS. TASK FORCE, NEW YORK CITY AUTOMATED DECISION 
SYSTEMS TASK FORCE REPORT (2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/adstaskforce/downloads/ 
pdf/ADS-Report-11192019.pdf. 
 285. Id. at 18-19. 
 286. H.B. 1655, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Wash. 2019); S.B. 5527, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Wash. 
2019); DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State to Rein in Automated Decision-Making, 
FAST COMPANY (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302465/ 
washington-introduces-landmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws. 
 287. See, e.g., Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 1-6 (describing a variety of race-adjusting 
36
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 19 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol19/iss3/1
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
37 
multiple states.288 For purposes of this Article, the law should provide HHS with 
jurisdiction to regulate algorithmic use by all health-care providers. To the extent 
possible, any future proposal should consider and address the critiques of the 
existing Algorithmic Accountability Act bill.289 
An algorithmic quality-control mandate should be a supplement to and not a 
replacement for litigation rights. The law might also include a private cause of 
action for individuals harmed by biased or flawed algorithms. Thus, if Congress 
does not amend the anti-discrimination laws,290 the Algorithmic Accountability 
Act could serve as an alternative pathway for relief for aggrieved patients. 
C. FDA Regulation 
At this time, it is unclear how and to what extent the FDA will ultimately 
regulate AI.291 FDA regulation is currently a patchwork and is continuously 
evolving.292 
The FDA acknowledges that its “traditional paradigm of medical device 
regulation was not designed for adaptive artificial intelligence and machine 
learning technologies.”293 In 2019, the FDA published a discussion paper detailing 
its “foundation for a potential approach to premarket review for artificial 
intelligence and machine learning-driven software modifications.”294 But the FDA 
has not enacted a clear set of AI regulations to date.295 The FDA typically does not 
regulate algorithms that are developed and employed in-house by health-care 
 
algorithms that are commonly used in a variety of specialties). 
 288. Christian D. Becker, Katherine Dandy, Max Gaujean, Mario Fusaro & Corey Scurlock, 
Commentary, Legal Perspectives on Telemedicine Part 1: Legal and Regulatory Issues, 
PERMANENTE J., Summer 2019, at 93, 94 (discussing cross-state licensure for telemedicine 
practitioners that enables them to practice in multiple states); About Mayo Clinic, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/about-mayo-clinic (last visited July 27, 2020), (stating that the Mayo 
Clinic has campuses in Minnesota, Arizona, and Florida); Top Artificial Intelligence Companies in 
Healthcare to Keep an Eye on, MED. FUTURIST (Jan. 21, 2020), https://medicalfuturist.com/top-
artificial-intelligence-companies-in-healthcare (naming national companies such as Google Health 
and IBM Watson Health as key players). 
 289. See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 290. See supra Section IV.A. 
 291. Bradley Merrill Thompson, New Developments in FDA Regulation of AI, MED. DEVICE & 
DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.mddionline.com/new-developments-fda-
regulation-ai. 
 292. See Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics 
Regulation, 98 N.C. L. REV. 123, 154-56 (2019) (discussing regulatory uncertainty). 
 293. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/ 
artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-software-medical-device (current as of Oct. 5, 2020). 
 294. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 43. 
 295. Murray et al., supra note 125 (describing the FDA’s “evolving regulatory landscape”). 
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entities.296 The agency has clarified that it intends to regulate certain types of 
software, such as software that analyzes “physiological signals” for diagnosis or 
therapeutic purposes,297 and it has approved many algorithms used in the field of 
radiology.298 The FDA also intends to focus attention on tools that are opaque and 
do not allow clinicians to review the basis of recommendations independently (i.e., 
black-box algorithms).299 
Determining the proper scope of FDA regulation in the realm of AI is beyond 
the scope of this article. However, to the extent that the agency does regulate AI 
algorithms, it should include requirements of algorithmic fairness in its oversight 
standards.300 
V. IMPROVING ALGORITHM DESIGN, VALIDATION, AND MONITORING 
PROCESSES 
It is appropriate and necessary to legislate quality control mandates for 
medical AI algorithms.301 But how can AI developers and users realistically ensure 
that these algorithms do not exacerbate health disparities and perpetuate 
discrimination? There is already a robust literature about promoting fairness in 
algorithms.302 Doing so requires deliberate action. As Professors Michael Kearns 
and Aaron Roth explain, 
[A]lgorithms . . . are good at optimizing what you ask them to 
optimize, but they cannot be counted on to do things you’d like 
them to do but didn’t ask for, nor to avoid doing things you don’t 
want but didn’t tell them not to do. Thus if we ask for accuracy 
 
 296. Price, supra note 1. 
 297. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 10-11, 25 (2019), https:// 
www.fda.gov/media/109618/download; Thompson, supra note 291. 
 298. Data Sci. Inst., FDA Cleared AI Algorithms, AM. C. RADIOLOGY, https://www.acrdsi.org/ 
DSI-Services/FDA-Cleared-AI-Algorithms (last visited July 7, 2020). 
 299. Murray et al., supra note 125. 
 300. See infra Section V.A, for recommendations as to how vendors can promote algorithmic 
fairness. 
 301. See supra Section IV.B.3. 
 302. See generally KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10; Chouldechova & Roth, supra note 25, at 82 
(“[T]he last two years have seen an unprecedented explosion in interest from the academic 
community in studying fairness and machine learning.”); Kenneth Holstein, Jennifer Wortman 
Vaughan, Hal Daumé III, Miroslav Dudík & Hanna Wallach, Improving Fairness in Machine 
Learning Systems: What Do Industry Practitioners Need?, CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS PROC., paper no. 600, at 1 (2019) (“The potential for machine learning (ML) systems to 
amplify social inequities and unfairness is receiving increasing popular and academic attention.”); 
Paulus & Kent, supra note 88 (proposing a provisional framework for evaluating clinical prediction 
models for bias and fairness). 
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but don’t mention fairness, we won’t get fairness. If we ask for 
one kind of fairness, we’ll get that kind but not others.303 
This Article’s purpose is not to develop a comprehensive blueprint for 
eliminating algorithmic bias and discriminatory AI outcomes. Instead, we want to 
show only that experts can take a large number of steps to protect patients. Some 
of these steps can be mandated in the Algorithmic Accountability Act or its 
regulations, and others will be best practices that developers and users implement 
as appropriate.304 
This Part outlines a variety of interventions that both AI designers and users 
can implement to promote fairness. It also addresses ambiguities in the concept of 
algorithmic fairness and the need for further research in the field. 
A. Algorithm Developers 
Developers of medical AI algorithms should focus on fairness concerns during 
the requirements, design, implementation, and validation processes.305 Developers 
must recognize the potential for discrimination with respect to AI that relies on 
population-specific identity306 and AI that could have a disparate impact on 
disadvantaged populations.307 
Since developing AI algorithms is a form of software engineering, ensuring 
their fairness and overall quality calls for applying software engineering best 
practices with special attention to fairness.308 Well-managed software development 
projects typically involve a series of phases, including requirements analysis and 
specification, design, implementation, testing, deployment, and operation.309 
1. Requirements Analysis 
Requirements analysis and specification involves determining and 
documenting the requirements for the software: what functionality and other 
attributes it must have to meet the needs of its users and other stakeholders.310 To 
help ensure that the requirements are complete, developers should elicit input from 
 
 303. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 87. 
 304. See supra Section IV.B (discussing the Algorithmic Accountability Act). 
 305. See generally IAN SOMMERVILLE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 66 (8th ed. 2007) (detailing the 
lifecycle of software). 
 306. See supra Sections II.E and IV.A.2. 
 307. See supra Section III.A. 
 308. Yuriy Brun & Alexandra Meliou, Software Fairness, PROC. 26TH ACM JOINT EUR. 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING CONF. & SYMP. ON FOUND. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 754, 754 (2018). 
 309. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 305, at 66-67. 
 310. KARL E. WIEGERS, SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS 7 (2d ed. 2003). 
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each distinct class of potential users and other stakeholders.311 In the case of 
medical AI algorithms, relevant stakeholders include: representatives of the 
protected group(s) and other patient groups, doctors, other caregivers, health 
informaticians, data scientists, and experts on discrimination.312 Requirements 
analysis should determine the fairness requirements and other ethical requirements 
for the algorithm, along with its medical purpose, the circumstances under which 
it will be used, its inputs and outputs, and its reliability, safety, performance, 
usability, and security requirements.313 Developers should select specific measures 
for assessing achievement of these properties.314 The requirements specifications 
should be validated by having them reviewed and critiqued by stakeholders, and, 
possibly, by implementing a prototype with which users can interact and which 
they can evaluate well before the production version is ready.315 
2. Software Design 
Software design involves creating a high-level description of a solution to the 
problem of satisfying the software requirements.316 The description includes the 
software’s components, their required functionality and constraints, their 
interfaces and their interactions, the flow of data and control between components, 
and the application’s user interface.317 In the case of medical AI algorithms, data 
scientists must additionally determine the type of learning algorithm or predictive 
model that will be employed (e.g., deep neural network), the specific inputs to the 
algorithm, and the specific output(s).318 
3. Software Implementation 
Software implementation involves programming the solution, typically by a 
 
 311. Id. at 101. 
 312. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 866. 
 313. Id.; see Johan Ordish, Hannah Murfet & Alison Hall, Algorithms as Medical Devices, PHG 
FOUND. 41-44 (2019), https://www.phgfoundation.org/documents/algorithms-as-medical-
devices.pdf (discussing requirements for software and manufacturers). 
 314. WIEGERS, supra note 310, at 342 (“Software measurements provide insights into your 
projects, products, and processes that are more accurate than subjective impressions or vague 
recollections of what happened in the past.”). 
 315. Id. at 53-54. 
 316. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 305, at 245-46. 
 317. Id. 
 318. SHALEV-SHWARTZ & BEN-DAVID, supra note 4, at 13-14. Deep neural networks, or deep 
learning, is a type of machine learning that allows computers “to learn from experience and 
understand the world in terms of a hierarchy of concepts, with each concept defined through its 
relation to simpler concepts.” GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 32, at 1. Therefore, computers learn 
more complicated concepts by building on simpler ones. Id. 
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combination of writing new program code and exploiting existing code.319 In the 
case of AI applications, high-quality implementations of learning algorithms are 
usually already available in various machine-learning code libraries.320 Exploiting 
them requires making specific choices about data representations, parameters, 
settings, and other details.321 In addition, to make their software usable by health-
care workers, developers must implement an intuitive user interface to guide users 
in invoking the algorithm appropriately to help solve a particular medical 
problem.322 As software components are acquired or developed, they are integrated 
with other components into working versions of the overall system, which have 
increasingly complete functionality.323 Fairness issues could, in principle, arise at 
any point as the result of design or implementation choices.324 It stands to reason 
that these problems are more likely to become evident to developers and users, and 
thus fixable, if fairness receives special attention during design reviews and during 
users’ evaluation of design prototypes. 
Medical AI algorithms have an additional stage of implementation that non-
AI software does not have: training the algorithm with data from real patients, 
including both individuals exhibiting the conditions of interest and individuals not 
exhibiting them.325 It is critically important that the training data be representative 
of the larger patient population to which a medical AI algorithm will be applied, 
including with respect to protected classes.326 
The main method for achieving representativeness is random sampling; that 
is, using a random mechanism, such as a pseudorandom number generator, to 
select individuals from the larger population, with every individual having a 
nonzero probability of selection.327 However, simple random sampling may be 
inadequate if a protected class or other important class of patients is rare because 
then it is likely that the class will be under-sampled.328 Alternative sampling 
 
 319. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 305, at 67, 447-49 (discussing component reuse). 
 320. See, e.g., An End-to-End Open Source Machine Learning Platform, TENSORFLOW, 
https://www.tensorflow.org (last visited June 30, 2020). 
 321. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 305, at 76-79 (discussing software design and implementation). 
 322. Id. at 363-66. 
 323. Id. at 33. 
 324. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 870 (emphasizing the need to focus on fairness at all 
stages of AI development and implementation). 
 325. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra Section II.B (discussing selection bias). 
 327. CARL-ERIK SÄRNDAL, BENGT SWENSSON & JAN WRETMAN, MODEL ASSISTED SURVEY 
SAMPLING 21 (1992) (stating that random sampling protects against selection bias and is viewed as 
objective); Yaron Ilan, Generating Randomness: Making the Most Out of Disordering a False Order 
into a Real One, 17 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 49, 49 (2019) (discussing pseudorandom-number 
generators). 
 328. Lyman L. McDonald, Sampling Rare Populations, in SAMPLING RARE OR ELUSIVE SPECIES: 
CONCEPTS, DESIGNS, AND TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATING POPULATION PARAMETERS 11, 16-17 
(William L. Thompson ed., 2004). 
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designs such as stratified sampling and adaptive sampling can be used to 
adequately sample such rare classes.329 
4. Testing 
For virtually all software, the final and most important form of validation is 
testing.330 At the testing stage, the software is executed on a set of test cases that 
developers created or an automated tool generated.331 The algorithm’s behavior 
and output are checked for conformance to requirements and to developer and user 
expectations.332 Typically, developers test the final application in-house and end 
users test it in the field.333 
Medical AI algorithms require additional testing that goes beyond that applied 
to other kinds of software.334 We recommend that prior to general release of a 
medical AI algorithm, developers evaluate it for safety, efficacy, and fairness on a 
large, representative sample of patients that is different from the sample from 
which they obtained training data. Admittedly, it may sometimes be very difficult 
to obtain a sizeable and appropriate sample of the relevant patient population.335 
However, researchers have developed techniques to reduce data bias.336 
Developers should collect the following during this evaluation: (1) measures 
of the outcome of interest (e.g., the proportion of patients correctly diagnosed as a 
result of applying the algorithm), (2) general measures of predictive performance, 
such as sensitivity and specificity,337 and (3) measures relating to the fairness and 
 
 329. Id. at 18-19 (discussing stratification of population). “In stratified sampling, the population 
is divided into nonoverlapping subpopulations called strata. A probability sample is selected in each 
stratum.” SÄRNDAL ET AL., supra note 327, at 100. Scientists who adaptively sample search for a 
population of interest at predetermined locations, and if appropriate subjects are found, they continue 
to search nearby. David R. Smith, Jennifer A. Brown & Nancy C.H. Lo, Application of Adaptive 
Sampling to Biological Populations, in SAMPLING RARE OR ELUSIVE SPECIES: CONCEPTS, DESIGNS, 
AND TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATING POPULATION PARAMETERS, supra note 328, at 77, 77. 
 330. RON PATTON, SOFTWARE TESTING 21 (2001). 
 331. PAUL AMMANN & JEFF OFFUTT, INTRODUCTION TO SOFTWARE TESTING 21-22, 67 (2d ed. 
2016). 
 332. Id. at 5-6. 
 333. SOMMERVILLE, supra note 305, at 540 (“For most systems, programmers take responsibility 
for testing the components that they have developed.”); see PATTON, supra note 330, at 244 
(discussing beta testing). 
 334. Sara Gerke, Boris Babic, Theodoros Evgeniou & I. Glenn Cohen, The Need for a System 
View to Regulate Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning-Based Software as Medical Device, 3 NPJ 
DIGITAL MED., art. no. 53, 2020, at 1, 4. 
 335. See supra Section II.B (discussing selection bias). 
 336. See Faisal Kamiran, Indrė Žliobaitė & Toon Calders, Quantifying Explainable 
Discrimination and Removing Illegal Discrimination in Automated Decision Making, 35 
KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYSTEMS 613, 615-16 (2013) (discussing local massaging, local preferential 
sampling, and local direct classification). 
 337. XIAO-HUA ZHOU, NANCY A. OBUCHOWSKI & DONNA K. MCCLISH, STATISTICAL METHODS 
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proportionality of the allocation of health-care resources.338 We recommend that, 
when possible, developers compute these measures for the whole sampled 
population and for the protected and non-protected subgroup(s) separately in order 
to enable comparisons between groups. 
5. Deployment and Operation 
Health-care providers should decide whether to deploy a medical AI algorithm 
only after all stakeholder groups have carefully evaluated testing results.339 Even 
when a medical AI algorithm is deemed fit for general use and is deployed, its 
evaluation should not stop.340 Rather, developers and users should monitor and 
evaluate the software continuously for reliability, safety, and fairness over its entire 
operational life. In between changes to the algorithm or its usage, evaluation could 
be less intensive (e.g., experts can review records of randomly sampled uses of the 
algorithm). However, if the algorithm is changed, the software should be evaluated 
as rigorously as it was before it was first deployed to ensure that changes did not 
accidentally introduce software defects.341 Finally, the developers should also 
provide a mechanism by which users can report discrimination or other problems 
they encounter. 
Proper validation, auditing, and monitoring can detect fairness problems, and 
appropriate interventions can often fix them.342 If an algorithm cannot be repaired, 
it should be abandoned or used selectively in a manner that avoids harm to 
protected groups. In the case of the algorithm that predicted which patients would 
miss appointments,343 experts redesigned the algorithm to omit personal attributes 
such as ethnicity, religion, financial status, and body mass index and left only prior 
history of health-care use and information about appointments in order to reduce 
(though not eliminate) its discriminatory impact.344 In the case of the algorithm 
used to identify candidates for high-risk management care programs,345 designers 
addressed its disparate impact by replacing the future cost variable with a variable 
 
IN DIAGNOSTIC MEDICINE 14 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that sensitivity is a test’s “ability to detect the 
condition when it is present” and specificity is a test’s “ability to exclude the condition in patients 
without the condition”). 
 338. Rajkomar et al., supra note 21, at 870. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. AMMANN & OFFUTT, supra note 331, at 304 (discussing regression testing and explaining 
that it is “the process of re-testing software that has been modified”). 
 342. Abu-Elyounes, supra note 31, at 52 (emphasizing the importance of auditing); Rajkomar 
et al., supra note 21, at 870. 
 343. See supra text accompanying notes 125-129. 
 344. Murray et al., supra note 125. See infra text accompanying notes 370-371, for additional 
steps taken to eliminate the algorithm’s harmful consequences. 
 345. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118. 
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“that combined health prediction with cost prediction.”346 
Developers (and users) should apply special scrutiny to algorithms that correct 
for race.347 Experts suggest that they focus on three specific questions.348 First, do 
strong evidence and statistical analyses support the need for race correction?349 
Second, is the race correction justified by a “plausible causal mechanism for the 
racial difference”?350 Third, does the race correction diminish or intensify health 
inequities?351 
Experts are developing a growing number of tools to promote fairness within 
the AI industry.352 One example is IBM’s AI Fairness 360.353 This is an open-
source software toolkit that “enables developers to use state-of-the-art algorithms 
to regularly check for unwanted biases . . . and to mitigate any biases that are 
discovered.”354 Such tools, in combination with other interventions discussed in 
this Article, have the potential to mitigate algorithmic biases and enhance fairness 
in meaningful ways.355 
B. Algorithm Users 
Some AI users develop algorithms themselves, and some employ AI that third 
parties develop with or without supplying their own training data.356 Clinicians 
who use AI obtained from outside vendors can be responsible for discriminatory 
outcomes that it generates, and thus they would do well to engage in their own 
assessment of the technology and its impacts.357 Like developers, AI users should 
 
 346. Obermeyer et al., supra note 114, at 453. 
 347. See supra Section II.F.2. 
 348. Vyas et al., supra note 141, at 880. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. (“In many cases, this appraisal will require further research into the complex 
interactions among ancestry, race, racism, socioeconomic status, and environment.”). 
 352. Holstein et al., supra note 302, at 1 (“A surge of recent work has focused on the 
development of algorithmic tools to assess and mitigate . . . unfairness.”). 
 353. AI Fairness 360, IBM DEVELOPER, https://developer.ibm.com/technologies/artificial-
intelligence/projects/ai-fairness-360 (last updated Mar. 9, 2020). 
 354. Id. 
 355. Abu-Elyounes, supra note 31, at 44-45 (“While these tools could be useful and might be 
able to point out potential problematic behavior of algorithms, they cannot be used alone, and should 
be taken with a grain of salt because mitigating bias cannot be fixed by a miracle.” Id. at 45.); Holstein 
et al., supra note 302, at 1-2 (“If such tools are to have a positive and meaningful impact on industry 
practice, however, it is crucial that their design be informed by an understanding of practitioners’ 
actual challenges and needs for support in developing fairer ML systems.” Id. at 2 (citation omitted).). 
 356. Emily J. Tait, Robert W. Kantner, Hilda C. Galvan & Jonathan M. Linas, Proposed 
Algorithmic Accountability Act Targets Bias in Artificial Intelligence, JONES DAY (June 2019), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/06/proposed-algorithmic-accountability-act. 
 357. See supra Part III. 
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be vigilant about discrimination when implementing AI that adjusts for race358 and 
AI that could have a disparate impact on disadvantaged populations.359 
The FTC issued AI guidance to parties under its jurisdiction in April of 
2020.360 Relevant recommendations include the following: 
 If you deny consumers something of value based on algorithmic decision-
making, explain why. 
 If you use algorithms to assign risk scores to consumers, also disclose the 
key factors that affected the score, rank ordered for importance. 
 Don’t discriminate based on protected classes. 
 Focus on inputs, but also on outcomes. 
 Make sure that your AI models are validated and revalidated to ensure that 
they work as intended, and do not illegally discriminate.361 
Much of the FTC’s advice applies to health-care providers. 
1. Transparency 
Health-care providers should consider discussing their use of AI with patients. 
Patients would likely appreciate knowing that clinicians are trying to use state-of-
the-art technology for their benefit and would value an explanation of any 
anticipated AI limitations. 
Professor I. Glenn Cohen has analyzed whether failure to disclose AI use 
constitutes a violation of the informed consent doctrine.362 He concludes that it 
does not, with a few possible but uncertain exceptions, “such as when patients 
inquire about the involvement of AI/ML, when the medical AI/ML is more opaque, 
when it is given an outsized role in the final decision-making, or when the AI/ML 
is used to reduce costs rather than improve patient health.”363 Indeed, if physicians 
research medical literature or query colleagues in the process of making a medical 
decision, they are not obligated to disclose to patients that they did so.364 Arguably, 
AI is an analogous source of input.365 Nevertheless, in some cases, as Professor 
 
 358. See supra Section II.F.2. 
 359. See supra Section II.E. 
 360. Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
(Apr. 8, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/04/using-
artificial-intelligence-algorithms. 
 361. Id. 
 362. I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and Medical Artificial Intelligence: What to Tell the 
Patient?, 108 GEO. L.J. 1425, 1432 (2020) (explaining that the informed consent doctrine provides 
that “liability could attach if a physician did not inform the patient of the risk and benefits of proposed 
treatment or nontreatment”). 
 363. Id. at 1428-29. 
 364. Id. at 1443-44. 
 365. Id. 
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Cohen notes, clinicians might protect themselves from liability through disclosure 
and obtaining the patient’s consent (e.g., if the doctor intends to rely exclusively 
on AI in making an important decision).366 Even if there is no danger of liability, 
discussing AI use might be the right thing to do in order to be candid with patients 
and keep them fully informed about their care.367 
2. Monitoring and Assessing AI Use 
Health-care providers should always remain vigilant about AI outcomes and 
do their best to detect any discriminatory outcomes. Jones Day, a prominent law 
firm, advises clients using externally-developed AI to investigate the developers’ 
mechanisms for eliminating bias and to assess whether their AI has a disparate 
impact on any class protected by the civil rights laws.368 Likewise, a group of 
Stanford University researchers advises that doctors using machine-learning 
systems educate themselves “about their construction, the data sets they are built 
on, and their limitations” in order to avoid “ethically problematic outcomes.”369 
Clinicians using AI must be prepared to intervene as soon as discrimination 
problems become apparent. For example, when users realized that an algorithm 
designed to predict appointment no-shows had an adverse impact on disadvantaged 
populations, they decided it was inappropriate to double-book the appointments in 
question and divert resources away from vulnerable individuals.370 Instead, they 
implemented “patient-positive” actions, such as appointment reminders and 
outreach to the identified people.371 It is also possible that a health-care providers’ 
patient mix will change over time, and an algorithm that was not problematic when 
initially deployed will generate discriminatory outcomes for a new patient 
population. 
In time, the health-care community may develop clinical practice guidelines 
and educational materials about best practices that minimize AI-related 
discrimination. For now, providers should recognize that they should not blindly 
 
 366. Id. at 1466. 
 367. Laura M. Cascella, Artificial Intelligence and Informed Consent, MEDPRO GROUP, 
https://www.medpro.com/artificial-intelligence-informedconsent (last visited June 13, 2020) 
(describing what clinicians should disclose to patients about their AI use); Emily Sokol, Artificial 
Intelligence’s Impact on Patient Safety, Outcomes, HEALTHITANALYTICS (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://healthitanalytics.com/news/artificial-intelligences-impact-on-patient-safety-outcomes 
(“Patients should also be informed of the potential for inaccurate diagnosis, whether that be over-
diagnosis or misdiagnosing as the result of AI technologies.”). 
 368. Tait et al., supra note 356. 
 369. Danton S. Char, Nigam H. Shah & David Magnus, Implementing Machine Learning in 
Health Care—Addressing Ethical Challenges, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 983 (2018). 
 370. Murray et al., supra note 125; see supra text accompanying notes 125-129. 
 371. Murray et al., supra note 125. 
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trust their AI and leave it entirely unchecked.372 
C. Having Realistic Expectations 
Improving algorithmic fairness is hard work, and fully achieving fairness is 
likely impossible.373 In one study, researchers interviewed and surveyed 267 
machine-learning practitioners about fairness-related challenges that they face, and 
respondents identified numerous difficulties.374 For example, many AI teams lack 
a process to collect and curate balanced and representative training datasets.375 
Respondents stated that they struggled to determine which subpopulations they 
should consider to guard against selection bias in particular applications. To 
illustrate, while it is natural to think about ethnicity and gender when worrying 
about inclusivity, the relevant attribute that may skew algorithmic outcomes could 
be being a native English speaker.376 In addition, teams often strain to discern the 
causes of unanticipated fairness problems, especially in the case of black-box 
AI.377 
In some instances, there are competing fairness goals, and they cannot all be 
fulfilled simultaneously.378 Imagine that an algorithm is designed to decide which 
applicants should receive loans and to promote fairness with respect to race.379 The 
algorithm’s developers will have to make some choices. They could emphasize 
group fairness, that is, that the same percentage of applicants of all races should 
get loans.380 In the alternative, they could emphasize individual fairness, meaning 
that two applicants who are identical in all ways except for race should always be 
 
 372. Price, supra note 178, at 295-96 (“[W]hile providers and facilities are ill suited to evaluate 
the substantive accuracy of black-box medical algorithms, they could and perhaps should be required 
to exercise due care to evaluate procedural quality—the expertise of the developer and the availability 
of independent external validation . . . .”). 
 373. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 108 (“[I]t is often hard to tease out subtle biases and their 
effects.”); Richard Berk, Hoda Heidari, Shahin Jabbari, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth, Fairness in 
Criminal Justice Risk Assessments: The State of the Art, SOC. METHODS & RES. (forthcoming, first 
published July 2018) (manuscript at 1), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 
pdf/10.1177/0049124118782533 (“[T]here are at least six kinds of fairness, some of which are 
incompatible with one another . . . .”). 
 374. Holstein et al., supra note 302, at 3-5, 6-12. 
 375. Id. at 6 (“A software engineer . . . described their team’s current data collection practices 
as ‘almost like the wild west’.”). 
 376..Id.; see also supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (describing a speech-analysis 
machine-learning tool that misdiagnosed non-native speakers as having Alzheimer’s disease because 
it misinterpreted pauses and mispronounciations). 
 377. Holstein et al., supra note 302, at 7. 
 378. KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 10, at 84-86 (discussing “fairness fighting fairness” 
(capitalization in title omitted)); Brun & Meliou, supra note 308, at 755. 
 379. Brun & Meliou, supra note 308, at 755; see supra note 30. 
 380. Id. 
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treated the same in terms of loan approval.381 Imagine further that there is a 
significant correlation between race and income, with Whites generally having 
higher incomes.382 If so, it will be impossible both to give the same percentage of 
applicants of all races loans and to treat all pairs of applicants that are identical in 
every way but race the same.383 If applicants need to earn at least $75,000 to obtain 
a loan, the algorithm could safeguard individual fairness, but group fairness will 
be unattainable because Whites will receive loans at a higher rate than African 
Americans.384 By contrast, if the lender emphasizes equalizing the percentage of 
applicants of all races who obtain approval for loans, it will sacrifice individual 
fairness.385 Some minorities will receive loans without having an adequate income, 
but the same will not be true for Whites.386 In this hypothetical, consequently, it is 
impossible to achieve the dual goal of group fairness and individual fairness.387 
The AI community, therefore, will have to be realistic about the degree and 
types of fairness that it can achieve. It may sometimes need to identify and 
prioritize conflicting fairness goals. Achieving comprehensive equality of 
outcomes, performance, and allocation is likely impossible.388 In addition, the 
government and industry must remain committed to funding and pursuing research 
regarding algorithmic fairness. Experts have identified a variety of vital research 
directions.389 These relate to collecting and curating high quality and appropriately 
diverse training datasets, fairness-oriented debugging tools, auditing methods, and 
educational resources.390 
CONCLUSION 
The health-care community is justifiably enthusiastic about the many possible 
advantages of AI. But not everyone consistently benefits from the introduction of 
this innovative technology, and algorithms are raising growing concerns about 
fairness and bias. 
As AI use proliferates in medicine, it is important that providers recognize its 
hazards and understand that some of these can lead to ethical challenges and 
liability exposure. AI algorithms adopt biases that are embedded in training data 
or that result from training data that is not sufficiently diverse and representative.391 
 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. See supra note 31, for other sources discussing the tension among different fairness goals. 
 388. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 389. Holstein et al., supra note 302, at 12. 
 390. Id. 
 391. See Ben Dickson, Healthcare Algorithms Are Biased, and the Results Can Be Deadly, PC 
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In addition, some deliberately adjust for race without adequate justification for 
doing so. These problems can lead to patient harm and unlawful discrimination. 
Private plaintiffs face very difficult terrain in attempting to litigate disparate 
impact discrimination claims in the health-care arena. Nevertheless, as 
Representative Yvette Clarke stated, “Algorithms shouldn’t have an exemption 
from our anti-discrimination laws.”392 Consequently, this Article argues that it is 
necessary to reinstate disparate impact litigation as a private enforcement tool in 
the AI era. It also recommends that Congress legislate AI-oversight requirements 
through an algorithmic accountability act and that the FDA consider the potential 
for discrimination in its algorithmic approval processes. 
It is true that many algorithms constitute black-box medicine and that even 
their developers often cannot fully explain how they function.393 Nevertheless, 
both developers and users must make every effort to determine whether AI 
exacerbates health disparities and perpetuates discrimination. To that end, the 
Article describes a variety of interventions that both developers and users should 
implement while designing, validating, using, and monitoring AI in order to bolster 
fairness. At the same time, the health-care community must accept that it is 
difficult to define fairness and that it may need to prioritize among conflicting 
fairness goals. 
As alluring as AI is and as tempting as it may be to trust it wholeheartedly, 
combatting discrimination requires human oversight. In the words of Dr. Steven 
Goodman and colleagues, “the only solution is to apply to artificial intelligence 
algorithms the very thing they are designed to supersede—human intelligence.”394 
With proper fairness-oriented oversight, AI can fulfill its promise of 
improving overall human health. Moreover, AI could in fact help combat 
discrimination by identifying those in greatest need and promoting more equitable 
allocation of health resources.395 
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 393. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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